

Reputation Based Distributed Trust Model for P2P Networks

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Abstract

Service-oriented Architectures (SOA) facilitate the dynamic and seamless integration of services offered by different service providers which in addition can be located in different trust domains. Especially for business integration scenarios, Federated Identity Management emerged as a possibility to propagate identity information as security assertions across company borders in order to secure the interaction between different services. Although this approach guarantees scalability regarding the integration of identity-based services, it exposes a service provider to new security risks. These security risks result from the complex trust relationships within a federation. In a federation the authentication of a user is not necessarily performed within the service provider's domain, but can be performed in the user's local domain. Consequently, the service provider has to rely on authentication results received from a federation partner to enforce access control. This implies that the quality of the authentication process is out of control by the service provider and therefore becomes a factor which needs to be considered in the access control step. In order to guarantee a designated level of security, the quality of the authentication process should be part of the access control decision. To ease this process, we propose in this paper a method to rate authentication information by a level of trust which describes the strength of an authentication method. Additionally, in order to support the concept of a two-factor authentication, we also present a mathematical model to calculate the trust level when combining two authentication methods. Quantitative Trust Management (QTM) provides a dynamic interpretation of authorization policies for access control decisions based on upon evolving reputations of the entities involved. QuanTM, a QTM system, selectively combines elements from trust management and reputation management to create a novel method for policy evaluation. Trust management, while effective in managing access with delegated credentials (as in PolicyMaker and KeyNote), needs greater flexibility in handling situations of partial trust. Reputation management provides a means to quantify trust, but lacks delegation and policy enforcement. This paper reports on QuanTM's design decisions and novel policy evaluation procedure. A representation of

quantified trust relationships, the trust dependency graph, and a sample QuanTM application specific to the KeyNote trust management language, are also proposed.

Keywords- Trust management, Trust levels, Authentication and Access Control, Web Service Federation, Federated Identity Management

I. INTRODUCTION

Creating software which is flexible and highly customizable to adapt to fast changing business needs has moved into the main focus of software developers. Enterprises demand a seamless communication between applications independent from the platform on which they run and even across domain boundaries. Service-oriented Architectures and XML Web Services have been designed to meet these concerns, allowing a flexible integration of services provided by independent business partners. However, the seamless and straightforward integration of cross-organisational services conflicts with the need to secure and control access to these services. The traditional approach to restrict service access is based on user authentication performed by the service provider itself, cf. [18]. Since credentials (e.g. user name and password) needed to access a service are issued and managed by the service provider, this approach is referred to as isolated identity management as stated in [13]. It requires service users to register a digital identity at each involved service provider and to authenticate separately for each service access. Federated Identity Management as a new identity model provides solutions for these problems by enabling the propagation of identity information to services located in different trust domains. It enables service users to access all services in a federation using the same identification data. Several frameworks and standards for Federated Identity Management have been specified (e.g. WS-Federation [1] and Liberty Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF) 2.0 [31]). The key concept in a federation is the establishment of trust whereby all parties in a federation are willing to rely on asserted claims about a digital identity such as SAML assertions [24]. As Service-oriented Architectures move from an isolated identity management scheme to a federated identity management, service providers are exposed to new risks. In a federation the authentication of a user is not necessarily performed within the service provider's domain, but

can be done within the user's local domain. Consequently, the service provider has to trust the authentication performed by the user's identity provider. In terms of security this is a critical situation since authorization and access control of the service are highly dependent on the authentication results. A weak authentication jeopardises the dependent service's security by increasing the risk that a user can personate as someone else and gain improper access. OASIS considers this as a serious risk [23] and recommends to agree on a common trust level in terms of policies, procedures and responsibilities to ensure that a relying party can trust the processes and methods used by the identity provider. Jøsang et. al. [13] describe the usage of such a common trust level as a symmetric trust relationship, since all parties are exposed to an equal risk in the case of failure. As opposed to this, having different trust requirements and mechanisms is referred to as an asymmetric trust relationship. They argue that asymmetric trust relationships are hard to establish, since the parties are exposed to different risks in the case of failure. However, with regard to complex SOA – that might be based on the dynamic selection of services and service providers – defining and enforcing a common trust level is disadvantageous: A symmetric trust relationship between the providers in a federation would require a trust level, which is sufficient for the service with the strongest authentication requirements. These requirements, however, might not be necessary for all services within the federation and might change if this service is dynamically replaced. Consequently, users are forced to authenticate by a predefined strong authentication method, even though weak authentication would be sufficient for the service they want to access. Likewise, when users are fixed to a predefined authentication method according to the specified trust level, access will be denied even though the user might be able to verify his identity in an even more trusted way. Altogether, there is a growing demand for more flexibility in authentication processes in SOA. To achieve this flexibility, a way to rate the trust relationship between identity provider and service provider is needed in order to restrict the service access based on an individual trust level. The general idea of classifying authentication methods according to their level of trustworthiness is not new. Especially in the field of e-Government, various countries have launched e-authentication initiatives in order to secure access to critical e-Government services [26, 11, 17, 5]. All of these initiatives have in common that they define authentication trust levels – mostly four different levels – in a way that covers the main use cases, reaching from “no security needed” to “critical application”. For each level, requirements for the authentication process are defined. This means, authentication methods are always assigned

to predefined levels, but not the other way around. To provide authentication in a truly flexible manner, we present in this paper:

- A formal definition of trust levels to quantify the trust that is established by using a particular authentication method. This definition is globally applicable and not restricted to a specific use case setting requiring specific bootstrapping algorithms. This way, the meaning of a trust level based on our approach is clear and can be applied to any use case without the need to know any further set up or environment parameters.
- A mathematical model to combine different authentication methods as used in a two-factor authentication and to calculate their combined authentication trust level.
- An example calculation that demonstrates the applicability of our mathematical model to existing authentication methods.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview about related work and current efforts in this area. In Section 3 we present our approach for assessing and quantifying trust in authentication methods. This section gives a definition for an authentication trust level and shows how this level can be determined. Section 4 introduces a mathematical model to calculate the trust value for the combination of two authentication methods taking into account the similarity of two mechanisms. To demonstrate the effect of the similarity on the combined trust level, an example calculation is presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper and highlights some future work. The emergence of distributed topologies and networked services has resulted in applications that are stored, maintained, and accessed remotely via a client/server model. The advantages of such a setup are many, but the challenges of access control and identity management must be addressed. Trust management and reputation management are two differing approaches to the problem. While effective with regard to explicit declarations, trust management lacks applicability when relationships are characterized by uncertainty. Thus, trust management is useful in enforcing existing trust relationships but ineffective in the formation of partially trusted ones. Reputation management provides a means of quantifying trust relationships dynamically, but lacks access enforcement and delegation mechanisms. To address this divide we introduce the notion of Quantitative Trust Management (QTM), an approach that merges concepts from trust and reputation management. It (QTM) creates a method for specifying both policy and reputation for dynamic decision making in access control settings. A system built upon QTM can not only enforce delegated authorizations but also adapt its policy as partial information becomes

more complete. The output is a quantitative trust value that expresses how much a policy-based decision should be trusted given the reputations of the entities involved. Further, to make this novel concept concrete, we propose QuanTM, an architecture for supporting QTM. In this application of QuanTM, we use the KeyNote [8, 7] (KN) trust management language and specification, due to its well defined delegation logic and compliance system. Summarily, a KN evaluator checks a user's access credentials against local policy to produce a compliance value from a finite and predefined set of values. The compliance value is then used to make access decisions. KN allows principals to delegate access rights to other principals without affecting the resulting compliance value. Further, KN is monotonic: If a given request evaluates to some compliance value, adding more credentials or delegations will not lower that value. We argue that credentials should not be explicitly trusted, nor should the trustworthiness of delegating principals be ignored. Furthermore, the result of evaluation for a given access request may need to be dynamic [9]. Service providers may find it desirable to arrive at different opinions based on local constraints, policies, and principals for the same request. In QuanTM, this is easily expressed. We address these issues in the following two ways: (1) It includes a means to dynamically assign reputation to principals and their relationships within a request, and (2) It provides a mechanism for combining this information to produce a trust value. In QuanTM, a trust value (often a real number) is used to represent the trustworthiness of a given compliance value and how it was reached. Our proposed QuanTM architecture (see Fig. 1) consists of three sub-systems:

1. Trust management consists of a trust language evaluator that verifies requests meet policy constraints, and a trust dependency graph (TDG) extractor that constructs a graph representing trust relationships.
2. Reputation management consists of two modules. First, a reputation algorithm to dynamically produce reputation values by combining feedback. These reputation values weigh TDG edges. Second, a reputation quantifier computes the trust value for a given request by evaluating the weighted TDG.
3. Decision management is composed of a decision maker that arrives at an access determination based on a trust value, context, and an application specific meta-policy that encodes a cost-benefit analysis. The design of QuanTM has been guided by the requirement that the individual components will be application specific, and thus, we have designed QuanTM modularly. QuanTM provides a simple interface by which different trust management languages, reputation algorithms, and decision procedures may be included. In this paper, we propose a QuanTM design instance that utilizes the

KeyNote language and TNA-SL [11, 12] reputation algorithm. This instance's implementation and evaluation is the subject of future work.

A. Background

Several approaches to define levels of trustworthiness for authentication mechanisms have been proposed in recent years indicating the importance of such a concept. In the area of e-Government, the UK Office of the e-Envoy has published a document called "Registration and Authentication – e-Government Strategy Framework Policy and Guideline" [26]. In this document the initial registration process of a person with the system as well as the authentication process for a user's engagement in an e-Government transaction are defined. Depending on the severity of consequences that might arise from unauthorized access, four authentication trust levels are defined, reaching from Level 0 for minimal damage up to Level 3 for substantial damage. The IDABC [11] (Interoperable Delivery of European eGovernment Services to public Administrations, Businesses and Citizens) is a similar project managed by the European Commission. It publishes recommendations and develops common solutions in order to improve the electronic communication within the public sector. Its Authentication Policy Document [7] defines four assurance levels as well, which are also associated with the potential damage that could be caused. For each of the four levels the document defines the requirements for the registration phase and for the electronic authentication. The e-Authentication Initiative is a major project of the e-Government program of the US. The core concept is a federated architecture with multiple e-Government applications and credential providers. The intention is that the e-Authentication Initiative provides an architecture which delivers a uniform, government-wide approach for authentication while leaving the choice of concrete authentication technologies with the individual government agencies. In this context, the initiative has published a policy called "EAuthentication Guidance for Federal Agencies" [5] to assist agencies in determining the appropriate level of identity assurance for electronic transactions. The document defines four assurance levels, which are based on the risks associated with an authentication error. Which technical requirements apply for each assurance level is described in a recommendation of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which is called

II. REPUTATION BASED DISTRIBUTED TRUST MODEL FOR P2P NETWORKS (RATM)

A. P2P Computing

In recent years, P2P computing has achieved its popularity in many distributed

applications, including file-sharing, digital content delivery, and so on [1]. However, peer anonymity and autonomy make P2P networks quite vulnerable to attacks by selfish and malicious peers. Previous work [1-3] shows that we can utilize the trust theory in social networks to construct reputation-based trust models, to suppress effectively these malicious behaviors. However, most of the current reputation-based trust models, unable to reflect the real trust situation of peers, don't provide the reliable measures to quantify and evaluate the trust value of peers, resulting in the fact that these models cannot effectively recognize and punish the peers with dynamic strategic fraudulent behaviors. With these research problems in mind, we propose a reputation-based distributed trust model for P2P networks (RATM), RATM takes into account the time factor fully in calculating the peer trust value, utilizing the index of the time zone (TZ) to flag the time property of experiences and recommendations from other peers. In RATM, the computing formulas of the trust deviation value (TDV), the trust abuse value (TAV), the peer trust value (PTV), the short trust value (STV), and the long trust value (LTV) are given, which are converged into the final trust value (FTV) of the peer. By these policies, RATM can effectively recognize, suppress and punish different kinds of malicious peers, and improve its dynamic adaptability greatly. The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follow: Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 formally introduces our trust model RATM. Section 4 simulates and discusses RATM. Finally, we conclude the paper and make suggestions for further research work.

We consider the following anycast field equations defined over an open bounded piece of network and /or feature space $\Omega \subset R^d$. They describe the dynamics of the mean anycast of each of p node populations.

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left(\frac{d}{dt} + l_i \right) V_i(t, r) = \sum_{j=1}^p \int_{\Omega} J_{ij}(r, \bar{r}) S[(V_j(t - \tau_{ij}(r, \bar{r}), \bar{r}) - h_j)] d\bar{r} \\ \quad + I_i^{ext}(r, t), \quad t \geq 0, 1 \leq i \leq p, \\ V_i(t, r) = \phi_i(t, r) \quad t \in [-T, 0] \end{array} \right. \quad (1)$$

We give an interpretation of the various parameters and functions that appear in (1), Ω is finite piece of nodes and/or feature space and is represented as an open bounded set of R^d . The vector r and \bar{r} represent points in Ω . The function $S: R \rightarrow (0, 1)$ is the normalized sigmoid function:

$$S(z) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-z}} \quad (2)$$

It describes the relation between the input rate v_i of population i as a function of the packets potential, for example, $V_i = v_i = S[\sigma_i(V_i - h_i)]$. We note

V the p -dimensional vector (V_1, \dots, V_p) . The p function $\phi_i, i = 1, \dots, p$, represent the initial conditions, see below. We note ϕ the p -dimensional vector (ϕ_1, \dots, ϕ_p) . The p function $I_i^{ext}, i = 1, \dots, p$, represent external factors from other network areas. We note I^{ext} the p -dimensional vector $(I_1^{ext}, \dots, I_p^{ext})$. The $p \times p$ matrix of functions $J = \{J_{ij}\}_{i,j=1,\dots,p}$ represents the connectivity between populations i and j , see below. The p real values $h_i, i = 1, \dots, p$, determine the threshold of activity for each population, that is, the value of the nodes potential corresponding to 50% of the maximal activity. The p real positive values $\sigma_i, i = 1, \dots, p$, determine the slopes of the sigmoids at the origin. Finally the p real positive values $l_i, i = 1, \dots, p$, determine the speed at which each anycast node potential decreases exponentially toward its real value. We also introduce the function $S: R^p \rightarrow R^p$, defined by $S(x) = [S(\sigma_1(x_1 - h_1)), \dots, S(\sigma_p(x_p - h_p))]$, and the diagonal $p \times p$ matrix $L_0 = \text{diag}(l_1, \dots, l_p)$. Is the intrinsic dynamics of the population given by the linear response of data transfer. $(\frac{d}{dt} + l_i)$ is replaced by $(\frac{d}{dt} + l_i)^2$ to use

the alpha function response. We use $(\frac{d}{dt} + l_i)$ for simplicity although our analysis applies to more general intrinsic dynamics. For the sake, of generality, the propagation delays are not assumed to be identical for all populations, hence they are described by a matrix $\tau(r, \bar{r})$ whose element $\tau_{ij}(r, \bar{r})$ is the propagation delay between population j at \bar{r} and population i at r . The reason for this assumption is that it is still unclear from anycast if propagation delays are independent of the populations. We assume for technical reasons that τ is continuous, that is $\tau \in C^0(\bar{\Omega}, R_+^{p \times p})$. Moreover packet data indicate that τ is not a symmetric function i.e., $\tau_{ij}(r, \bar{r}) \neq \tau_{ji}(\bar{r}, r)$, thus no assumption is made about this symmetry unless otherwise stated. In order to compute the righthand side of (1), we need to know the node potential factor V on interval $[-T, 0]$. The value of T is obtained by considering the maximal delay:

$$\tau_m = \max_{i,j(r,r \in \Omega \times \Omega)} \tau_{i,j}(r, \bar{r}) \quad (3)$$

Hence we choose $T = \tau_m$

B. Trust Model in Component Based System

TRUST plays an important role in software systems, especially component-based systems in which components or their environments vary. Generally, a component based software system (CBSS) consists of a number of components interacting over well-defined interfaces. They are exported to applications capable of combining and using them to provide various features. Thus, common components can be effectively shared by a number of applications. Typically, such a system allows the addition and deletion of components after deployment. Therefore, the execution of a component in relation to other system entities needs to be considered. Despite component trustworthiness in isolation, its execution could cause problems due to simultaneously sharing system resources with others or having special requirements. The dependability and security, i.e., trustworthiness of a component or a number of correlated components, is dynamically changed in such a system. As a simple example, a mobile healthcare application is composed of a number of components: a healthcare service component, a network access component, and a healthcare User Interface (UI) component. Of those components, the network access component could be simultaneously used by a number of applications. The trustworthiness of the healthcare application not only depends on each above component's trustworthiness, but also the cooperation of all related components in the underlying system environment. It is important to ensure that all components cooperate well in order to satisfy trust requirements with each other. The network access component needs to provide a secure network connection and communication. It also needs to respond to a request from the healthcare service component within an expected time, perform reliably without errors, and cater for urgent health data transmission. For instance, if the system deploys additional components that share the network access component and other resources, the mobile health care application must still be capable of providing qualified services. Furthermore, additional influences on the system have to be considered. For example, to ensure its trustworthiness the system needs to adapt itself accordingly since currently applied trust control mechanisms are unsuitable against some malicious behavior or attacks. For this purpose, we propose an adaptive trust control model, vital for supporting autonomic trust management in component-based software systems. As seen in the above example, component-based software engineering (CBSE) has

many benefits regarding reuse of components and adaptation, but also introduces additional trust concerns. First, we need to ensure the trustworthiness of both isolated and correlated components in various situations. Second, the components should satisfy each other's overall trust requirements during component execution. Consequently, the component-based software system needs a mechanism to ensure performance and establish the system's trust in an autonomic way, even if the internal and external environments change. This creates the need for trust management with regard to software component installation and execution. Assessment and management of trust, however, is difficult in a component-based software system. First, existing work on trust evaluation is generally system specific, focusing mostly on distributed systems [17], [19], [20], [21], [24], [26], [27], [29], [32], [33], [35], [36], [42]. Additional work is required in order to apply it to component software domains [29], [40]. Second, trust is influenced by many security and dependability related factors. These factors could be treated differently by different entities (e.g., software components) in different situations due to various expectations from system users. This makes assessing and managing trust very challenging in a dynamic environment. Third, the component-based software system should effectively adapt itself to changing system context in order to ensure trust. Context is hard to comprehensively model due to its complexity, however, especially in a component-based software system. For instance, context elements can influence some aspects of trust positively and others negatively. This introduces additional challenges for autonomic trust management with context awareness [38]. In this paper, we adopt a holistic notion of trust, which includes availability, reliability, integrity, safety, maintainability, and confidentiality, depending on the requirements of a trustor. Hence, trust is defined as the trustor's assessment on how well the observed behavior or performance, measurable by the above-specified Quality Attributes (QAs) of a trustee, meets the desired standards for an intended purpose [3]. We develop a trust control model based on Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs) [18], which suitably represents the causal relationships that exist among trust, its related properties (i.e., QAs), and trust control mechanisms. This model can be used to specify, evaluate, establish, and ensure trust relationships existing among system entities. Based on this, we propose an autonomic trust management solution for component-based software systems focusing mainly on system runtime. Applying the proposed trust control model, we predict trustworthiness and select suitable control mechanisms for managing trust in an autonomic approach. We further design a number of algorithms, adoptable by a trust management

framework, for autonomic trust management during component execution. The trust model presented here differs from prior work as it considers the trust control mechanisms' influence in order to support autonomic trust management according to the system's competence [10], [11], [12], [30], [43], [44]. It is not a model only for the purpose of trust evaluation and decision support, but also autonomic trust maintenance. Concretely, to overcome the above challenges, we implement an adaptive trust control model for autonomic trust management. We assume several trust control modes. Each containing a number of trust control mechanisms or operations, e.g., encryption, authentication, hash code based integrity check, access control mechanisms, duplication of process, man-in-middle solutions for improving availability, etc. A control mode can be treated as a special configuration of trust management provided by the system. Based on a runtime trust assessment, the main objective of autonomic trust management is assurance of a suitable set of control modes applied in the system. Herein, we use runtime trust assessment results to autonomously adjust the adaptive trust control model in order to select a suitable set of control modes in an underlying system context. The selection is conducted by comparing the trust values predicted by the adaptive trust control model, supposing application of different control modes. Thus, the main contribution of this paper is the presentation and analysis of the adaptive trust control model and the algorithms to manage suitable trust control modes for ensuring trustworthiness. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of literature background and related work. Section 3 specifies the basic notion of autonomic trust management for a component-based software system. Section 4 presents the adaptive trust control model. The algorithms used for autonomic trust management are described in Section 5, followed by experimental simulation results in Section 6. We further discuss the issues of deployment and the feasibility of the model in Section 7. Finally, we present our conclusion and future work prospects.

C. Mathematical Framework

A convenient functional setting for the non-delayed packet field equations is to use the space $F = L^2(\Omega, R^p)$ which is a Hilbert space endowed with the usual inner product:

$$\langle V, U \rangle_F = \sum_{i=1}^p \int_{\Omega} V_i(r) U_i(r) dr \quad (1)$$

To give a meaning to (1), we defined the history space $C = C^0([-\tau_m, 0], F)$ with

$\|\phi\| = \sup_{t \in [-\tau_m, 0]} \|\phi(t)\|_F$, which is the Banach phase space associated with equation (3). Using the

notation $V_t(\theta) = V(t + \theta), \theta \in [-\tau_m, 0]$, we write (1) as

$$\begin{cases} \dot{V}(t) = -L_0 V(t) + L_1 S(V_t) + I^{ext}(t), \\ V_0 = \phi \in C, \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Where

$$\begin{cases} L_1 : C \rightarrow F, \\ \phi \rightarrow \int_{\Omega} J(\cdot, \bar{r}) \phi(\bar{r}, -\tau(\cdot, \bar{r})) d\bar{r} \end{cases}$$

Is the linear continuous operator satisfying $\|L_1\| \leq \|J\|_{L^2(\Omega^2, R^{p \times p})}$. Notice that most of the papers on this subject assume Ω infinite, hence requiring $\tau_m = \infty$.

Proposition 1.0 If the following assumptions are satisfied.

1. $J \in L^2(\Omega^2, R^{p \times p})$,
2. The external current $I^{ext} \in C^0(R, F)$,
3. $\tau \in C^0(\overline{\Omega^2}, R_+^{p \times p}), \sup_{\overline{\Omega^2}} \tau \leq \tau_m$.

Then for any $\phi \in C$, there exists a unique solution $V \in C^1([0, \infty), F) \cap C^0([-\tau_m, \infty), F)$ to (3)

Notice that this result gives existence on R_+ , finite-time explosion is impossible for this delayed differential equation. Nevertheless, a particular solution could grow indefinitely, we now prove that this cannot happen.

D. Boundedness of Solutions

A valid model of neural networks should only feature bounded packet node potentials.

Theorem 1.0 All the trajectories are ultimately bounded by the same constant R if $I \equiv \max_{t \in R^+} \|I^{ext}(t)\|_F < \infty$.

Proof :Let us defined $f : R \times C \rightarrow R^+$ as

$$f(t, V_t) = \left\langle -L_0 V_t(0) + L_1 S(V_t) + I^{ext}(t), V(t) \right\rangle_F = \frac{1}{2} \frac{d \|V\|_F^2}{dt}$$

We note $l = \min_{i=1, \dots, p} l_i$

$$f(t, V_t) \leq -l \|V(t)\|_F^2 + (\sqrt{p} \|\Omega\| \|J\|_F + I) \|V(t)\|_F$$

Thus, if

$$\|V(t)\|_F \geq 2 \frac{\sqrt{p} \|\Omega\| \|J\|_F + I}{l} = R, f(t, V_t) \leq -\frac{l R^2}{2} = -\delta < 0$$

Let us show that the open route of F of center 0

and radius R, B_R , is stable under the dynamics of equation. We know that $V(t)$ is defined for all $t \geq 0$ and that $f < 0$ on ∂B_R , the boundary of B_R . We consider three cases for the initial condition V_0 . If $\|V_0\|_C < R$ and set $T = \sup\{t \mid \forall s \in [0, t], V(s) \in \overline{B_R}\}$. Suppose that $T \in R$, then $V(T)$ is defined and belongs to $\overline{B_R}$, the closure of B_R , because $\overline{B_R}$ is closed, in effect to ∂B_R , we also have

$$\frac{d}{dt} \|V\|_F^2 \Big|_{t=T} = f(T, V_T) \leq -\delta < 0$$

because $V(T) \in \partial B_R$. Thus we deduce that for $\varepsilon > 0$ and small enough, $V(T + \varepsilon) \in \overline{B_R}$ which contradicts the definition of T . Thus $T \notin R$ and $\overline{B_R}$ is stable.

Because $f < 0$ on $\partial B_R, V(0) \in \partial B_R$ implies that $\forall t > 0, V(t) \in B_R$. Finally we consider the case $V(0) \in \overline{CB_R}$. Suppose that $\forall t > 0, V(t) \notin \overline{B_R}$, then

$$\forall t > 0, \frac{d}{dt} \|V\|_F^2 \leq -2\delta, \quad \text{thus } \|V(t)\|_F$$

is monotonically decreasing and reaches the value of R in finite time when $V(t)$ reaches ∂B_R . This contradicts our assumption. Thus $\exists T > 0 \mid V(T) \in B_R$.

Proposition 1.1 : Let s and t be measured simple functions on X . for $E \in \mathcal{M}$, define

$$\phi(E) = \int_E s d\mu \quad (1)$$

Then ϕ is a measure on M .

$$\int_X (s+t) d\mu = \int_X s d\mu + \int_X t d\mu \quad (2)$$

Proof : If s and if E_1, E_2, \dots are disjoint members of M whose union is E , the countable additivity of μ shows that

$$\begin{aligned} \phi(E) &= \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \mu(A_i \cap E) = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \sum_{r=1}^{\infty} \mu(A_i \cap E_r) \\ &= \sum_{r=1}^{\infty} \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \mu(A_i \cap E_r) = \sum_{r=1}^{\infty} \phi(E_r) \end{aligned}$$

Also, $\phi(\phi) = 0$, so that ϕ is not identically ∞ .

Next, let s be as before, let β_1, \dots, β_m be the distinct values of t , and let $B_j = \{x : t(x) = \beta_j\}$ If

$$E_{ij} = A_i \cap B_j, \quad \text{the}$$

$$\int_{E_{ij}} (s+t) d\mu = (\alpha_i + \beta_j) \mu(E_{ij})$$

$$\text{and } \int_{E_{ij}} s d\mu + \int_{E_{ij}} t d\mu = \alpha_i \mu(E_{ij}) + \beta_j \mu(E_{ij})$$

Thus (2) holds with E_{ij} in place of X . Since X is the disjoint union of the sets E_{ij} ($1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq j \leq m$), the first half of our proposition implies that (2) holds.

Theorem 1.1: If K is a compact set in the plane whose complement is connected, if f is a continuous complex function on K which is holomorphic in the interior of K , and if $\varepsilon > 0$, then there exists a polynomial P such that $|f(z) - P(z)| < \varepsilon$ for all $z \in K$. If the interior of K is empty, then part of the hypothesis is vacuously satisfied, and the conclusion holds for every $f \in \mathcal{C}(K)$. Note that K need to be connected.

Proof: By Tietze's theorem, f can be extended to a continuous function in the plane, with compact support. We fix one such extension and denote it again by f . For any $\delta > 0$, let $\omega(\delta)$ be the supremum of the numbers $|f(z_2) - f(z_1)|$ Where z_1 and z_2 are subject to the condition $|z_2 - z_1| \leq \delta$. Since f is uniformly continuous, we have $\lim_{\delta \rightarrow 0} \omega(\delta) = 0$ (1) From now on, δ will be fixed. We shall prove that there is a polynomial P such that

$$|f(z) - P(z)| < 10,000 \omega(\delta) \quad (z \in K) \quad (2)$$

By (1), this proves the theorem. Our first objective is the construction of a function $\Phi \in \mathcal{C}_c'(R^2)$, such that for all z

$$|f(z) - \Phi(z)| \leq \omega(\delta), \quad (3)$$

$$|(\partial\Phi)(z)| < \frac{2\omega(\delta)}{\delta}, \quad (4)$$

And

$$\Phi(z) = -\frac{1}{\pi} \iint_X \frac{(\partial\Phi)(\zeta)}{\zeta - z} d\zeta d\eta \quad (\zeta = \xi + i\eta), \quad (5)$$

Where X is the set of all points in the support of Φ whose distance from the complement of K

does not δ . (Thus X contains no point which is "far within" K .) We construct Φ as the convolution of f with a smoothing function A . Put $a(r) = 0$ if $r > \delta$, put

$$a(r) = \frac{3}{\pi\delta^2} \left(1 - \frac{r^2}{\delta^2}\right)^2 \quad (0 \leq r \leq \delta), \quad (6)$$

And define

$$A(z) = a(|z|) \quad (7)$$

For all complex z . It is clear that $A \in C_c^1(\mathbb{R}^2)$. We claim that

$$\iint_{\mathbb{R}^2} A = 1, \quad (8)$$

$$\iint_{\mathbb{R}^2} \partial A = 0, \quad (9)$$

$$\iint_{\mathbb{R}^2} |\partial A| = \frac{24}{15\delta} < \frac{2}{\delta}, \quad (10)$$

The constants are so adjusted in (6) that (8) holds. (Compute the integral in polar coordinates), (9) holds simply because A has compact support. To compute (10), express ∂A in polar coordinates,

and note that $\frac{\partial A}{\partial \theta} = 0$,

$$\frac{\partial A}{\partial r} = -a',$$

Now define

$$\Phi(z) = \iint_{\mathbb{R}^2} f(z-\zeta) A d\xi d\eta = \iint_{\mathbb{R}^2} A(z-\zeta) f(\zeta) d\xi d\eta \quad (11)$$

Since f and A have compact support, so does Φ . Since

$$\begin{aligned} & \Phi(z) - f(z) \\ &= \iint_{\mathbb{R}^2} [f(z-\zeta) - f(z)] A(\xi) d\xi d\eta \quad (12) \end{aligned}$$

And $A(\zeta) = 0$ if $|\zeta| > \delta$, (3) follows from (8).

The difference quotients of A converge boundedly to the corresponding partial derivatives, since $A \in C_c^1(\mathbb{R}^2)$. Hence the last expression in (11) may be differentiated under the integral sign, and we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} (\partial\Phi)(z) &= \iint_{\mathbb{R}^2} (\partial A)(z-\zeta) f(\zeta) d\xi d\eta \\ &= \iint_{\mathbb{R}^2} f(z-\zeta) (\partial A)(\zeta) d\xi d\eta \\ &= \iint_{\mathbb{R}^2} [f(z-\zeta) - f(z)] (\partial A)(\zeta) d\xi d\eta \quad (13) \end{aligned}$$

The last equality depends on (9). Now (10) and (13) give (4). If we write (13) with Φ_x and Φ_y in place of $\partial\Phi$, we see that Φ has continuous partial derivatives, if we can show that $\partial\Phi = 0$ in G , where G is the set of all $z \in K$ whose distance from the complement of K exceeds δ . We shall do this by showing that

$$\Phi(z) = f(z) \quad (z \in G); \quad (14)$$

Note that $\partial f = 0$ in G , since f is holomorphic there. Now if $z \in G$, then $z - \zeta$ is in the interior of K for all ζ with $|\zeta| < \delta$. The mean value property for harmonic functions therefore gives, by the first equation in (11),

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi(z) &= \int_0^\delta a(r) r dr \int_0^{2\pi} f(z - re^{i\theta}) d\theta \\ &= 2\pi f(z) \int_0^\delta a(r) r dr = f(z) \iint_{\mathbb{R}^2} A = f(z) \quad (15) \end{aligned}$$

For all $z \in G$, we have now proved (3), (4), and (5) The definition of X shows that X is compact and that X can be covered by finitely many open discs D_1, \dots, D_n , of radius 2δ , whose centers are not in K . Since $S^2 - K$ is connected, the center of each D_j can be joined to ∞ by a polygonal path in $S^2 - K$. It follows that each D_j contains a compact connected set E_j , of diameter at least 2δ , so that $S^2 - E_j$ is connected and so that $K \cap E_j = \emptyset$. with $r = 2\delta$. There are functions $g_j \in H(S^2 - E_j)$ and constants b_j so that the inequalities.

$$|Q_j(\zeta, z)| < \frac{50}{\delta}, \quad (16)$$

$$\left| Q_j(\zeta, z) - \frac{1}{z-\zeta} \right| < \frac{4,000\delta^2}{|z-\zeta|^2} \quad (17)$$

Hold for $z \notin E_j$ and $\zeta \in D_j$, if

$$Q_j(\zeta, z) = g_j(z) + (\zeta - b_j) g_j^2(z) \quad (18)$$

Let Ω be the complement of $E_1 \cup \dots \cup E_n$. Then Ω is an open set which contains K . Put $X_1 = X \cap D_1$ and $X_j = (X \cap D_j) - (X_1 \cup \dots \cup X_{j-1})$, for $2 \leq j \leq n$,

Define

$$R(\zeta, z) = Q_j(\zeta, z) \quad (\zeta \in X_j, z \in \Omega) \quad (19)$$

And

$$F(z) = \frac{1}{\pi} \iint_X (\partial\Phi)(\zeta) R(\zeta, z) d\zeta d\eta \quad (20)$$

($z \in \Omega$)

Since,

$$F(z) = \sum_{j=1}^n \frac{1}{\pi} \iint_{X_j} (\partial\Phi)(\zeta) Q_j(\zeta, z) d\zeta d\eta, \quad (21)$$

(18) shows that F is a finite linear combination of the functions g_j and g_j^2 . Hence $F \in H(\Omega)$. By (20), (4), and (5) we have

$$|F(z) - \Phi(z)| < \frac{2\omega(\delta)}{\pi\delta} \iint_X |R(\zeta, z) - \frac{1}{z - \zeta} d\zeta d\eta| \quad (z \in \Omega) \quad (22)$$

Observe that the inequalities (16) and (17) are valid with R in place of Q_j if $\zeta \in X$ and $z \in \Omega$.

Now fix $z \in \Omega$, put $\zeta = z + \rho e^{i\theta}$, and estimate the integrand in (22) by (16) if $\rho < 4\delta$, by (17) if $4\delta \leq \rho$. The integral in (22) is then seen to be less than the sum of

$$2\pi \int_0^{4\delta} \left(\frac{50}{\delta} + \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \rho d\rho = 808\pi\delta \quad (23)$$

And

$$2\pi \int_{4\delta}^{\infty} \frac{4,000\delta^2}{\rho^2} \rho d\rho = 2,000\pi\delta. \quad (24)$$

Hence (22) yields

$$|F(z) - \Phi(z)| < 6,000\omega(\delta) \quad (z \in \Omega) \quad (25)$$

Since $F \in H(\Omega)$, $K \subset \Omega$, and $S^2 - K$ is connected, Runge's theorem shows that F can be uniformly approximated on K by polynomials. Hence (3) and (25) show that (2) can be satisfied. This completes the proof.

Lemma 1.0 : Suppose $f \in C_c'(R^2)$, the space of all continuously differentiable functions in the plane, with compact support. Put

$$\partial = \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\partial}{\partial x} + i \frac{\partial}{\partial y} \right) \quad (1)$$

Then the following "Cauchy formula" holds:

$$f(z) = -\frac{1}{\pi} \iint_{R^2} \frac{(\partial f)(\zeta)}{\zeta - z} d\xi d\eta$$

$$(\zeta = \xi + i\eta) \quad (2)$$

Proof: This may be deduced from Green's theorem. However, here is a simple direct proof:

Put $\varphi(r, \theta) = f(z + re^{i\theta})$, $r > 0$, θ real

If $\zeta = z + re^{i\theta}$, the chain rule gives

$$(\partial f)(\zeta) = \frac{1}{2} e^{i\theta} \left[\frac{\partial}{\partial r} + \frac{i}{r} \frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} \right] \varphi(r, \theta) \quad (3)$$

The right side of (2) is therefore equal to the limit, as $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$, of

$$-\frac{1}{2} \int_{\varepsilon}^{\infty} \int_0^{2\pi} \left(\frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r} + \frac{i}{r} \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial \theta} \right) d\theta dr \quad (4)$$

For each $r > 0$, φ is periodic in θ , with period 2π . The integral of $\partial\varphi / \partial\theta$ is therefore 0, and (4) becomes

$$-\frac{1}{2\pi} \int_0^{2\pi} d\theta \int_{\varepsilon}^{\infty} \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial r} dr = \frac{1}{2\pi} \int_0^{2\pi} \varphi(\varepsilon, \theta) d\theta \quad (5)$$

As $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$, $\varphi(\varepsilon, \theta) \rightarrow f(z)$ uniformly. This gives (2)

If $X^\alpha \in a$ and $X^\beta \in k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$, then $X^\alpha X^\beta = X^{\alpha+\beta} \in a$, and so A satisfies the condition (*). Conversely,

$$\left(\sum_{\alpha \in A} c_\alpha X^\alpha \right) \left(\sum_{\beta \in \square^n} d_\beta X^\beta \right) = \sum_{\alpha, \beta} c_\alpha d_\beta X^{\alpha+\beta} \quad (\text{finite sums}),$$

and so if A satisfies (*), then the subspace generated by the monomials $X^\alpha, \alpha \in a$, is an ideal. The proposition gives a classification of the monomial ideals in $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$: they are in one to one correspondence with the subsets A of \square^n satisfying (*). For example, the monomial ideals in $k[X]$ are exactly the ideals (X^n) , $n \geq 1$, and the zero ideal (corresponding to the empty set A). We write $\langle X^\alpha \mid \alpha \in A \rangle$ for the ideal corresponding to A (subspace generated by the $X^\alpha, \alpha \in a$).

LEMMA 1.1. Let S be a subset of \square^n . The the ideal a generated by $X^\alpha, \alpha \in S$ is the monomial ideal corresponding to

$$A \stackrel{df}{=} \{ \beta \in \square^n \mid \beta - \alpha \in \square^n, \text{ some } \alpha \in S \}$$

Thus, a monomial is in a if and only if it is divisible by one of the $X^\alpha, \alpha \in S$

PROOF. Clearly A satisfies $(*)$, and $a \subset \langle X^\beta \mid \beta \in A \rangle$. Conversely, if $\beta \in A$, then $\beta - \alpha \in \square^n$ for some $\alpha \in S$, and $X^\beta = X^\alpha X^{\beta-\alpha} \in a$. The last statement follows from the fact that $X^\alpha \mid X^\beta \Leftrightarrow \beta - \alpha \in \square^n$. Let

$A \subset \square^n$ satisfy $(*)$. From the geometry of A , it is clear that there is a finite set of elements $S = \{ \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_s \}$ of A such that $A = \{ \beta \in \square^n \mid \beta - \alpha_i \in \square^2, \text{ some } \alpha_i \in S \}$

(The α_i 's are the corners of A) Moreover, $a \stackrel{df}{=} \langle X^\alpha \mid \alpha \in A \rangle$ is generated by the monomials $X^{\alpha_i}, \alpha_i \in S$.

DEFINITION 1.0. For a nonzero ideal a in $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$, we let $(LT(a))$ be the ideal generated by $\{ LT(f) \mid f \in a \}$

LEMMA 1.2 Let a be a nonzero ideal in $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$; then $(LT(a))$ is a monomial ideal, and it equals $(LT(g_1), \dots, LT(g_n))$ for some $g_1, \dots, g_n \in a$.

PROOF. Since $(LT(a))$ can also be described as the ideal generated by the leading monomials (rather than the leading terms) of elements of a .

THEOREM 1.2. Every ideal a in $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ is finitely generated; more precisely, $a = (g_1, \dots, g_s)$ where g_1, \dots, g_s are any elements of a whose leading terms generate $LT(a)$

PROOF. Let $f \in a$. On applying the division algorithm, we find $f = a_1 g_1 + \dots + a_s g_s + r$, $a_i, r \in k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$

, where either $r=0$ or no monomial occurring in it is divisible by any $LT(g_i)$. But $r = f - \sum a_i g_i \in a$, and therefore $LT(r) \in LT(a) = (LT(g_1), \dots, LT(g_s))$, implies that every monomial occurring in r is divisible by one in $LT(g_i)$. Thus $r=0$, and $g \in (g_1, \dots, g_s)$.

DEFINITION 1.1. A finite subset $S = \{ g_1, \dots, g_s \}$ of an ideal a is a standard (Gröbner) bases for a if $(LT(g_1), \dots, LT(g_s)) = LT(a)$. In other words, S is a standard basis if the leading term of every element of a is divisible by at least one of the leading terms of the g_i .

THEOREM 1.3 The ring $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ is Noetherian i.e., every ideal is finitely generated.

PROOF. For $n=1$, $k[X]$ is a principal ideal domain, which means that every ideal is generated by single element. We shall prove the theorem by induction on n . Note that the obvious map $k[X_1, \dots, X_{n-1}][X_n] \rightarrow k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ is an isomorphism – this simply says that every polynomial f in n variables X_1, \dots, X_n can be expressed uniquely as a polynomial in X_n with coefficients in $k[X_1, \dots, X_{n-1}]$:

$$f(X_1, \dots, X_n) = a_0(X_1, \dots, X_{n-1})X_n^r + \dots + a_r(X_1, \dots, X_{n-1})$$

Thus the next lemma will complete the proof

LEMMA 1.3. If A is Noetherian, then so also is $A[X]$

PROOF. For a polynomial

$$f(X) = a_0 X^r + a_1 X^{r-1} + \dots + a_r, \quad a_i \in A, \quad a_0 \neq 0,$$

r is called the degree of f , and a_0 is its leading coefficient. We call 0 the leading coefficient of the polynomial 0. Let a be an ideal in $A[X]$. The leading coefficients of the polynomials in a form an ideal a' in A , and since A is Noetherian, a' will be finitely generated. Let g_1, \dots, g_m be elements of a whose leading coefficients generate

a' , and let r be the maximum degree of g_i . Now let $f \in a$, and suppose f has degree $s > r$, say, $f = aX^s + \dots$. Then $a \in a'$, and so we can write $a = \sum b_i a_i$, $b_i \in A$,
 $a_i = \text{leading coefficient of } g_i$

Now

$f - \sum b_i g_i X^{s-r_i}$, $r_i = \text{deg}(g_i)$, has degree $< \text{deg}(f)$. By continuing in this way, we find that

$f \equiv f_t \pmod{(g_1, \dots, g_m)}$ With f_t a polynomial of degree $t < r$. For each $d < r$, let a_d be the subset of A consisting of 0 and the leading coefficients of all polynomials in a of degree d ; it is again an ideal in A . Let $g_{d,1}, \dots, g_{d,m_d}$ be polynomials of degree d whose leading coefficients generate a_d . Then the same argument as above shows that any polynomial f_d in a of degree d can be written

$f_d \equiv f_{d-1} \pmod{(g_{d,1}, \dots, g_{d,m_d})}$ With f_{d-1} of degree $\leq d-1$. On applying this remark repeatedly we find that $f_t \in (g_{r-1,1}, \dots, g_{r-1,m_{r-1}}, \dots, g_{0,1}, \dots, g_{0,m_0})$ Hence

$f_t \in (g_1, \dots, g_m, g_{r-1,1}, \dots, g_{r-1,m_{r-1}}, \dots, g_{0,1}, \dots, g_{0,m_0})$

and so the polynomials g_1, \dots, g_{0,m_0} generate a

E. Key Exchange in Wireless Sensor Networks

Wireless sensor networks are susceptible to various types of security threats such as eavesdropping, message replay, and fabrication of messages. These threats can be avoided by introducing various safety mechanisms such as authentication, confidentiality, and message integrity. These safety mechanisms are dependent upon cryptographic schemes that need robust and secure key exchange mechanism. If the key exchange mechanism is securely carried out successfully, we say that the two nodes have established "Trust" in each other. If one or multiple communicating nodes are compromised before the successful key exchange, any subsequent safety mechanisms are rendered ineffective. Thus there is a clear need to establish trust between communicating nodes. So, to establish secure communications, we need to ensure that all communicating nodes are trusted. That's why trust establishment is a prerequisite of any security implementation and both are tightly interdependent. Current research on sensor network security is mostly built on the assumption of a trusted environment [1]. Security solutions such as SPINS [2], TinySec [3], LiSP [4],

and LSec [5] etc that have been developed so far are based on this same assumption. Traditional trust management schemes [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] that have been developed for wired and wireless ad-hoc networks are not suitable for wireless sensor networks because of higher consumption of resources such as memory and power as we will discuss here. Therefore we need a lightweight trust management scheme for large scale distributed wireless sensor networks. Trust management schemes can be either centralized or distributed, but we believe that neither completely centralized nor completely distributed trust management schemes are suitable for wireless sensor networks. Centralized trust schemes are not appropriate because they are energy expensive due to extra routing overhead. In large sensor networks, the total routing cost for the exchange of trust values of a sensor node with the base station is quite energy expensive when the base station is far away from the node. Totally distributed approaches are also not suitable because each node has limited memory and computation power. In a distributed approach, each node needs to maintain the up-to-date record about the trust values of entire network in the form of a database. The size of the database is directly proportional to the size of the network. It is not possible for a single sensor node to store and compute the trust values of the entire network. Therefore some hybrid scheme is needed. We also believe that sensor nodes mostly fulfill their responsibilities in a cooperative manner [11] rather than individually. Therefore instead of calculating individual trust, it is more appropriate to calculate the trust for the entire group. Research on trust management scheme for wireless sensor networks is in the infancy state. Hence, in this work, we propose a novel lightweight group based trust management scheme (GTMS) for distributed wireless sensor networks that is based on a hybrid trust management scheme. Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the Group based trust management scheme. Section 3 consists of conclusion and future directions. Opportunistic networks (oppnets) are a novel paradigm for specialized ad hoc networks [1]. Oppnets differ from traditional networks, in which the nodes of a single network are all deployed together, with the network size and locations of its nodes pre-designed. In oppnets, the initial seed oppnet grows into an expanded oppnet by enrolling foreign nodes, which become helpers, assisting the oppnet in the realization of its goals. Due to the nature of this oppnet growth, candidate helpers may be highly heterogeneous devices with diverse software and hardware capabilities. In order for a seamless interaction to occur among potential helpers and the oppnet, a common basis for communication must first be established. This can help a seed oppnet node to discover potential helpers that possess the desired resources and to invite the chosen candidates

to join the oppnet. Typically, an oppnet structure [2] includes: (1) a seed oppnet – a self-configured ad hoc network; (2) distributed Control Center nodes (CC nodes) – a subset of the seed nodes that look into the overall operations of oppnet; (3) helpers – wire or wireless entities able to capture, communicate, and transmit information or signals (typically, the discovery of helpers in oppnets goes beyond locating resources, it requires the design of some negotiation techniques to identify trustworthy and good quality helpers); (4) lites – helpers with limited capabilities. The key purpose of oppnets is to benefit from the resources and capabilities available via its helpers to realize its goal. To this effect, one of the major challenges of an oppnet is to timely detect and identify the malicious devices, and to prevent them from joining the network, while ensuring the privacy and security of the oppnet. Of course, the ability to talk and disseminate information among nodes securely is of paramount importance. As pointed out in [2], oppnets have two mechanisms of defense: (1) preventive mechanisms – which prevent the incorporation of malevolent helpers into the network; and (2) reactive mechanisms – which monitor the behavior of already incorporated nodes to identify malicious entities. An oppnet can maintain a list of trusted devices which are assessed based on experience and reputation, as well as a list of untrusted entities. This paper advocates that by learning from the context of trust and trust management in the Semantic Web using ontologies, it is possible to introduce trust and trust management into the oppnet context. We present a novel Semantic Web solution, which provides an architectural basis for representing trust and trust management in oppnets. In this solution, named the COTTON model, software agents are expected to use trust information from the Semantic Web framework, to make security decisions, for instance, on access control. The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents related work on trust management for the Semantic Web, and analyzes the applicability of trust management to oppnet. Section III describes the proposed COTTON model. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper. way we live and even the way we think. The pace at which things are being redefined is simply staggering, yet real. On one hand, technologies have greatly improved efficiency by simplifying business approach and, time constraints. But on the other, there is a growing concern about the trustworthiness of these online services and, peer users. Trust, as ever, embraces a broad spectrum of meanings. While some of them define trust at an abstract level, some are more detailed. Nevertheless all these definitions truly imply that trust is a complex subjective phenomenon. For the sake of relevance and for the purpose of illustration, we have chosen to use the definition by Gambetta [6]: ... trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the

subjective probability with which an agent will perform a particular action, both before [we] can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity of ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects [our] own action. Here, it is apparent that at any given time, stability of a community, physical or otherwise can depend on the right balance of trust as well as (in symmetry) mistrust. And online identities are no exception. Purely because identity systems not only provide the underlying basis for communication of online identities, but also the communication between these identities can typically span multiple domains, services, applications all of which may or may not trust and be trusted to the same extent. Lack of or inconsistencies in trust relationships across services highlight the need for a general-purpose trust management of online identities. Moreover, typically an identity system can encapsulate a suite of functionalities, beginning from authentication, authorization, accounting, to integration with multiple service providers. And from user's perspective, security, privacy and trust are among the important issues that they place high expectations on when facing new personalization technologies [11]. Concerns on these issues stem from the fact that a large amount of personal information and information that is critical (private) to users are often stored, transmitted, and processed in personalized services. Without proper treatment of these issues, users would refuse to take part in new services, because the questions at stake are "How safe is this information?" and "How trustworthy are the parties who store this information?" While issues like security can be dealt relatively in a more technical sense, trust on the other hand is more complex as it contains elements of subjectivity and social aspects such as reputation. Trust in many scenarios disseminates from a judgment or opinion that transpire from face-to-face meetings or from recommendations from colleagues and, friends. However, in the context of online world there is a need for more formalized approach, as it generally does not involve human interaction [7][18]. In essence, having a trust management system in place for identities may not only brew applications to incorporate several inter-domain inter-application security policies, but also clearly enhance user experience. While we identified the need for trust in an online identity scenario, we have to assess the methods to achieve that. In order to assess plausible methods, one should also have in mind the growing number of online services, and the apparent overload that stems from the fact that users end up managing innumerable identities. Therefore, it is only logical to analyze the trust requirements that result from various identity management models today and propose a relatively simpler yet realistic approach to trust in identity systems. The proposed solution should implement methods to

alter trust values of entities (of identity system) and use these trust values for various decision making purposes across applications and, service providers. In order to line out our approach clearly, the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the state of the art in identity management and trust management systems. Section III enlists the criteria/features of the proposed trust in an identity system, while Section IV describes the architecture of trust in the identity system.

One of the great successes of category theory in computer science has been the development of a “unified theory” of the constructions underlying denotational semantics. In the untyped λ -calculus, any term may appear in the function position of an application. This means that a model D of the λ -calculus must have the property that given a term t whose interpretation is $d \in D$, Also, the interpretation of a functional abstraction like $\lambda x . x$ is most conveniently defined as a function from D to D , which must then be regarded as an element of D . Let $\psi : [D \rightarrow D] \rightarrow D$ be the function that picks out elements of D to represent elements of $[D \rightarrow D]$ and $\phi : D \rightarrow [D \rightarrow D]$ be the function that maps elements of D to functions of D . Since $\psi(f)$ is intended to represent the function f as an element of D , it makes sense to require that $\phi(\psi(f)) = f$, that is, $\psi \circ \phi = id_{[D \rightarrow D]}$ Furthermore, we often want to view every element of D as representing some function from D to D and require that elements representing the same function be equal – that is

$$\psi(\phi(d)) = d$$

or

$$\psi \circ \phi = id_D$$

The latter condition is called extensionality. These conditions together imply that ϕ and ψ are inverses--- that is, D is isomorphic to the space of functions from D to D that can be the interpretations of functional abstractions: $D \cong [D \rightarrow D]$. Let us suppose we are working with the untyped λ -calculus, we need a solution of the equation $D \cong A + [D \rightarrow D]$, where A is some predetermined domain containing interpretations for elements of C . Each element of D corresponds to either an element of A or an element of $[D \rightarrow D]$, with a tag. This equation can be solved by finding least fixed points of the

function $F(X) = A + [X \rightarrow X]$ from domains to domains --- that is, finding domains X such that $X \cong A + [X \rightarrow X]$, and such that for any domain Y also satisfying this equation, there is an embedding of X to Y --- a pair of maps

$$X \begin{array}{c} \xrightarrow{f} \\ \square \\ \xleftarrow{f^R} \end{array} Y$$

Such that

$$f^R \circ f = id_X$$

$$f \circ f^R \subseteq id_Y$$

Where $f \subseteq g$ means that f approximates g in some ordering representing their information content. The key shift of perspective from the domain-theoretic to the more general category-theoretic approach lies in considering F not as a function on domains, but as a *functor* on a category of domains. Instead of a least fixed point of the function, F .

Definition 1.3: Let K be a category and $F : K \rightarrow K$ as a functor. A fixed point of F is a pair (A, a) , where A is a **K-object** and $a : F(A) \rightarrow A$ is an isomorphism. A prefixed point of F is a pair (A, a) , where A is a **K-object** and a is any arrow from $F(A)$ to A

Definition 1.4 : An ω -chain in a category K is a diagram of the following form:

$$\Delta = D_0 \xrightarrow{f_0} D_1 \xrightarrow{f_1} D_2 \xrightarrow{f_2} \dots$$

Recall that a cocone μ of an ω -chain Δ is a K -object X and a collection of K -arrows $\{\mu_i : D_i \rightarrow X \mid i \geq 0\}$ such that $\mu_i = \mu_{i+1} \circ f_i$ for all $i \geq 0$. We sometimes write $\mu : \Delta \rightarrow X$ as a reminder of the arrangement of μ 's components. Similarly, a colimit $\mu : \Delta \rightarrow X$ is a cocone with the property that if $\nu : \Delta \rightarrow X'$ is also a cocone then there exists a unique mediating arrow $k : X \rightarrow X'$ such that for all $i \geq 0$, $\nu_i = k \circ \mu_i$.

Colimits of ω -chains are sometimes referred to as ω -colimits. Dually, an ω^{op} -chain in K is a diagram of the following form:

$$\Delta = D_0 \xleftarrow{f_0} D_1 \xleftarrow{f_1} D_2 \xleftarrow{f_2} \dots$$

A cone $\mu : X \rightarrow \Delta$ of an ω^{op} -chain Δ is a K -object X and a collection of K -arrows $\{\mu_i : D_i \mid i \geq 0\}$ such that for all $i \geq 0$, $\mu_i = f_i \circ \mu_{i+1}$. An ω^{op} -limit of an ω^{op} -chain Δ is a cone $\mu : X \rightarrow \Delta$

with the property that if $v : X' \rightarrow \Delta$ is also a cone, then there exists a unique mediating arrow $k : X' \rightarrow X$ such that for all $i \geq 0, \mu_i \circ k = v_i$.

We write \perp_k (or just \perp) for the distinguish initial object of K , when it has one, and $\perp \rightarrow A$ for the unique arrow from \perp to each K -object A . It is also convenient to write $\Delta^- = D_1 \xrightarrow{f_1} D_2 \xrightarrow{f_2} \dots$ to

denote all of Δ except D_0 and f_0 . By analogy, μ^- is $\{\mu_i | i \geq 1\}$. For the images of Δ and μ under F we write $F(\Delta) = F(D_0) \xrightarrow{F(f_0)} F(D_1) \xrightarrow{F(f_1)} F(D_2) \xrightarrow{F(f_2)} \dots$

and $F(\mu) = \{F(\mu_i) | i \geq 0\}$

We write F^i for the i -fold iterated composition of F that is, $F^0(f) = f, F^1(f) = F(f), F^2(f) = F(F(f))$, etc. With these definitions we can state that every monotonic function on a complete lattice has a least fixed point:

Lemma 1.4. Let K be a category with initial object \perp and let $F : K \rightarrow K$ be a functor. Define the ω -chain Δ by

$$\Delta = \perp \xrightarrow{\perp \rightarrow F(\perp)} F(\perp) \xrightarrow{F(\perp \rightarrow F(\perp))} F^2(\perp) \xrightarrow{F^2(\perp \rightarrow F(\perp))} \dots$$

If both $\mu : \Delta \rightarrow D$ and $F(\mu) : F(\Delta) \rightarrow F(D)$ are colimits, then (D, d) is an initial F -algebra, where $d : F(D) \rightarrow D$ is the mediating arrow from $F(\mu)$ to the cocone μ^-

Theorem 1.4 Let a DAG G given in which each node is a random variable, and let a discrete conditional probability distribution of each node given values of its parents in G be specified. Then the product of these conditional distributions yields a joint probability distribution P of the variables, and (G, P) satisfies the Markov condition.

Proof. Order the nodes according to an ancestral ordering. Let X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n be the resultant ordering. Next define.

$$P(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = P(x_n | pa_n) P(x_{n-1} | pa_{n-1}) \dots P(x_2 | pa_2) P(x_1 | pa_1),$$

Where PA_i is the set of parents of X_i of in G and $P(x_i | pa_i)$ is the specified conditional probability distribution. First we show this does indeed yield a joint probability distribution. Clearly,

$0 \leq P(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \leq 1$ for all values of the variables. Therefore, to show we have a joint distribution, as the variables range through all their possible values, is equal to one. To that end, Specified conditional distributions are the conditional distributions they notationally represent in the joint distribution. Finally, we show the Markov condition is satisfied. To do this, we need show for $1 \leq k \leq n$ that whenever

$$P(pa_k) \neq 0, \text{ if } P(nd_k | pa_k) \neq 0$$

$$\text{and } P(x_k | pa_k) \neq 0$$

$$\text{then } P(x_k | nd_k, pa_k) = P(x_k | pa_k),$$

Where ND_k is the set of nondescendants of X_k of in G . Since $PA_k \subseteq ND_k$, we need only show $P(x_k | nd_k) = P(x_k | pa_k)$. First for a given k , order the nodes so that all and only nondescendants of X_k precede X_k in the ordering. Note that this ordering depends on k , whereas the ordering in the first part of the proof does not. Clearly then

$$ND_k = \{X_1, X_2, \dots, X_{k-1}\}$$

Let

$$D_k = \{X_{k+1}, X_{k+2}, \dots, X_n\}$$

follows $\sum d_k$

We define the m^{th} cyclotomic field to be the field $Q[x]/(\Phi_m(x))$ Where $\Phi_m(x)$ is the m^{th} cyclotomic polynomial. $Q[x]/(\Phi_m(x))$ has degree $\varphi(m)$ over Q since $\Phi_m(x)$ has degree $\varphi(m)$. The roots of $\Phi_m(x)$ are just the primitive m^{th} roots of unity, so the complex embeddings of $Q[x]/(\Phi_m(x))$ are simply the $\varphi(m)$ maps

$$\sigma_k : Q[x]/(\Phi_m(x)) \mapsto C,$$

$$1 \leq k < m, (k, m) = 1, \text{ where}$$

$$\sigma_k(x) = \xi_m^k,$$

ξ_m being our fixed choice of primitive m^{th} root of unity. Note that $\xi_m^k \in Q(\xi_m)$ for every k ; it follows that $Q(\xi_m) = Q(\xi_m^k)$ for all k relatively prime to m . In particular, the images of the σ_i coincide, so $Q[x]/(\Phi_m(x))$ is Galois over Q .

This means that we can write $Q(\xi_m)$ for $Q[x]/(\Phi_m(x))$ without much fear of ambiguity; we will do so from now on, the identification being $\xi_m \mapsto x$. One advantage of this is that one can easily talk about cyclotomic fields being extensions of one another, or intersections or compositums; all of these things take place considering them as subfield of C . We now investigate some basic properties of cyclotomic fields. The first issue is whether or not they are all distinct; to determine this, we need to know which roots of unity lie in $Q(\xi_m)$. Note, for example, that if m is odd, then $-\xi_m$ is a $2m^{\text{th}}$ root of unity. We will show that this is the only way in which one can obtain any non- m^{th} roots of unity.

LEMMA 1.5 If m divides n , then $Q(\xi_m)$ is contained in $Q(\xi_n)$

PROOF. Since $\xi_m^{n/m} = \xi_n$, we have $\xi_m \in Q(\xi_n)$, so the result is clear

LEMMA 1.6 If m and n are relatively prime, then

$$Q(\xi_m, \xi_n) = Q(\xi_{mn})$$

and

$$Q(\xi_m) \cap Q(\xi_n) = Q$$

(Recall the $Q(\xi_m, \xi_n)$ is the compositum of $Q(\xi_m)$ and $Q(\xi_n)$)

PROOF. One checks easily that $\xi_m \xi_n$ is a primitive mn^{th} root of unity, so that

$$Q(\xi_{mn}) \subseteq Q(\xi_m, \xi_n)$$

$$\begin{aligned} [Q(\xi_m, \xi_n) : Q] &\leq [Q(\xi_m) : Q][Q(\xi_n) : Q] \\ &= \varphi(m)\varphi(n) = \varphi(mn); \end{aligned}$$

Since $[Q(\xi_{mn}) : Q] = \varphi(mn)$; this implies that

$Q(\xi_m, \xi_n) = Q(\xi_{mn})$ We know that $Q(\xi_m, \xi_n)$ has degree $\varphi(mn)$ over Q , so we must have

$$[Q(\xi_m, \xi_n) : Q(\xi_m)] = \varphi(n)$$

and

$$[Q(\xi_m, \xi_n) : Q(\xi_n)] = \varphi(m)$$

$$[Q(\xi_m) : Q(\xi_m) \cap Q(\xi_n)] \geq \varphi(m)$$

And thus that $Q(\xi_m) \cap Q(\xi_n) = Q$

PROPOSITION 1.2 For any m and n

$$Q(\xi_m, \xi_n) = Q(\xi_{[m,n]})$$

And

$$Q(\xi_m) \cap Q(\xi_n) = Q(\xi_{(m,n)});$$

here $[m, n]$ and (m, n) denote the least common multiple and the greatest common divisor of m and n , respectively.

PROOF. Write $m = p_1^{e_1} \dots p_k^{e_k}$ and $p_1^{f_1} \dots p_k^{f_k}$ where the p_i are distinct primes. (We allow e_i or f_i to be zero)

$$Q(\xi_m) = Q(\xi_{p_1^{e_1}}) Q(\xi_{p_2^{e_2}}) \dots Q(\xi_{p_k^{e_k}})$$

and

$$Q(\xi_n) = Q(\xi_{p_1^{f_1}}) Q(\xi_{p_2^{f_2}}) \dots Q(\xi_{p_k^{f_k}})$$

Thus

$$\begin{aligned} Q(\xi_m, \xi_n) &= Q(\xi_{p_1^{e_1}}) \dots Q(\xi_{p_2^{e_k}}) Q(\xi_{p_1^{f_1}}) \dots Q(\xi_{p_k^{f_k}}) \\ &= Q(\xi_{p_1^{e_1}}) Q(\xi_{p_1^{f_1}}) \dots Q(\xi_{p_k^{e_k}}) Q(\xi_{p_k^{f_k}}) \\ &= Q(\xi_{p_1^{\max(e_1, f_1)}}) \dots Q(\xi_{p_k^{\max(e_k, f_k)}}) \\ &= Q(\xi_{p_1^{\max(e_1, f_1)} \dots p_k^{\max(e_k, f_k)}}) \\ &= Q(\xi_{[m,n]}); \end{aligned}$$

An entirely similar computation shows that $Q(\xi_m) \cap Q(\xi_n) = Q(\xi_{(m,n)})$

Mutual information measures the information transferred when x_i is sent and y_i is received, and is defined as

$$I(x_i, y_i) = \log_2 \frac{P(x_i/y_i)}{P(x_i)} \text{ bits} \quad (1)$$

In a noise-free channel, each y_i is uniquely connected to the corresponding x_i , and so they constitute an input-output pair (x_i, y_i) for which

$$P(x_i/y_i) = 1 \text{ and } I(x_i, y_i) = \log_2 \frac{1}{P(x_i)} \text{ bits;}$$

that is, the transferred information is equal to the self-information that corresponds to the input x_i In

a very noisy channel, the output y_i and input x_i would be completely uncorrelated, and so

$$P(x_i/y_i) = P(x_i) \text{ and also } I(x_i, y_i) = 0; \text{ that is,}$$

there is no transference of information. In general, a given channel will operate between these two extremes. The mutual information is defined between the input and the output of a given channel. An average of the calculation of the mutual information for all input-output pairs of a given channel is the average mutual information:

$$I(X, Y) = \sum_{i,j} P(x_i, y_j) I(x_i, y_j) = \sum_{i,j} P(x_i, y_j) \log_2 \left[\frac{P(x_i/y_j)}{P(x_i)} \right]$$

bits per symbol. This calculation is done over the input and output alphabets. The average mutual information. The following expressions are useful for modifying the mutual information expression:

$$P(x_i, y_j) = P(x_i/y_j)P(y_j) = P(y_j/x_i)P(x_i)$$

$$P(y_j) = \sum_i P(y_j/x_i)P(x_i)$$

$$P(x_i) = \sum_j P(x_i/y_j)P(y_j)$$

Then

$$I(X, Y) = \sum_{i,j} P(x_i, y_j) \log_2 \left[\frac{1}{P(x_i)} \right]$$

$$- \sum_{i,j} P(x_i, y_j) \log_2 \left[\frac{1}{P(x_i/y_j)} \right]$$

$$\sum_{i,j} P(x_i, y_j) \log_2 \left[\frac{1}{P(x_i)} \right]$$

$$= \sum_i \left[P(x_i/y_j)P(y_j) \right] \log_2 \frac{1}{P(x_i)}$$

$$\sum_i P(x_i) \log_2 \frac{1}{P(x_i)} = H(X)$$

$$I(X, Y) = H(X) - H(X/Y)$$

Where

$$H(X/Y) = \sum_{i,j} P(x_i, y_j) \log_2 \frac{1}{P(x_i/y_j)} \quad \text{is}$$

usually called the equivocation. In a sense, the equivocation can be seen as the information lost in the noisy channel, and is a function of the backward conditional probability. The observation of an output symbol y_j provides $H(X) - H(X/Y)$ bits of information. This difference is the mutual

information of the channel. *Mutual Information: Properties* Since

$$P(x_i/y_j)P(y_j) = P(y_j/x_i)P(x_i)$$

The mutual information fits the condition

$$I(X, Y) = I(Y, X)$$

And by interchanging input and output it is also true that

$$I(X, Y) = H(Y) - H(Y/X)$$

Where

$$H(Y) = \sum_j P(y_j) \log_2 \frac{1}{P(y_j)}$$

This last entropy is usually called the noise entropy. Thus, the information transferred through the channel is the difference between the output entropy and the noise entropy. Alternatively, it can be said that the channel mutual information is the difference between the number of bits needed for determining a given input symbol before knowing the corresponding output symbol, and the number of bits needed for determining a given input symbol after knowing the corresponding output symbol

$$I(X, Y) = H(X) - H(X/Y)$$

As the channel mutual information expression is a difference between two quantities, it seems that this parameter can adopt negative values. However, and in spite of the fact that for some y_j , $H(X/y_j)$ can be larger than $H(X)$, this is not possible for the average value calculated over all the outputs:

$$\sum_{i,j} P(x_i, y_j) \log_2 \frac{P(x_i/y_j)}{P(x_i)} = \sum_{i,j} P(x_i, y_j) \log_2 \frac{P(x_i, y_j)}{P(x_i)P(y_j)}$$

Then

$$-I(X, Y) = \sum_{i,j} P(x_i, y_j) \frac{P(x_i)P(y_j)}{P(x_i, y_j)} \leq 0$$

Because this expression is of the form

$$\sum_{i=1}^M P_i \log_2 \left(\frac{Q_i}{P_i} \right) \leq 0$$

The above expression can be applied due to the factor $P(x_i)P(y_j)$, which is the product of two probabilities, so that it behaves as the quantity Q_i , which in this expression is a dummy variable that fits the condition $\sum_i Q_i \leq 1$. It can be concluded that the average mutual information is a non-negative number. It can also be equal to zero, when the input and the output are independent of each other. A related entropy called the joint entropy is defined as

$$\begin{aligned}
 H(X, Y) &= \sum_{i,j} P(x_i, y_j) \log_2 \frac{1}{P(x_i, y_j)} \\
 &= \sum_{i,j} P(x_i, y_j) \log_2 \frac{P(x_i)P(y_j)}{P(x_i, y_j)} \\
 &+ \sum_{i,j} P(x_i, y_j) \log_2 \frac{1}{P(x_i)P(y_j)}
 \end{aligned}$$

Theorem 1.5: Entropies of the binary erasure channel (BEC) The BEC is defined with an alphabet of two inputs and three outputs, with symbol probabilities.

$P(x_1) = \alpha$ and $P(x_2) = 1 - \alpha$, and transition probabilities

$$P(y_3/x_2) = 1 - p \text{ and } P(y_3/x_1) = 0,$$

$$\text{and } P(y_2/x_1) = 0$$

$$\text{and } P(y_1/x_2) = p$$

$$\text{and } P(y_3/x_2) = 1 - p$$

Lemma 1.7. Given an arbitrary restricted time-discrete, amplitude-continuous channel whose restrictions are determined by sets F_n and whose density functions exhibit no dependence on the state s , let n be a fixed positive integer, and $p(x)$ an arbitrary probability density function on Euclidean n -space. $p(y|x)$ for the density $p_n(y_1, \dots, y_n | x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and F for F_n . For any real number a , let

$$A = \left\{ (x, y) : \log \frac{p(y|x)}{p(y)} > a \right\} \quad (1)$$

Then for each positive integer u , there is a code (u, n, λ) such that

$$\lambda \leq ue^{-a} + P\{(X, Y) \notin A\} + P\{X \notin F\}$$

Where

$$P\{(X, Y) \in A\} = \int_A \dots \int p(x, y) dx dy, \quad p(x, y) = p(x)p(y|x)$$

and

$$P\{X \in F\} = \int_F \dots \int p(x) dx$$

Proof: A sequence $x^{(1)} \in F$ such that

$$P\{Y \in A_{x^{(1)}} | X = x^{(1)}\} \geq 1 - \varepsilon$$

where $A_x = \{y : (x, y) \in A\}$;

Choose the decoding set B_1 to be $A_{x^{(1)}}$. Having chosen $x^{(1)}, \dots, x^{(k-1)}$ and B_1, \dots, B_{k-1} , select $x^k \in F$ such that

$$P\left\{Y \in A_{x^{(k)}} - \bigcup_{i=1}^{k-1} B_i \mid X = x^{(k)}\right\} \geq 1 - \varepsilon;$$

Set $B_k = A_{x^{(k)}} - \bigcup_{i=1}^{k-1} B_i$. If the process does not terminate in a finite number of steps, then the sequences $x^{(i)}$ and decoding sets $B_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, u$, form the desired code. Thus assume that the process terminates after t steps. (Conceivably $t = 0$). We will show $t \geq u$ by showing that $\varepsilon \leq te^{-a} + P\{(X, Y) \notin A\} + P\{X \notin F\}$. We proceed as follows.

Let

$$B = \bigcup_{j=1}^t B_j. \text{ (If } t = 0, \text{ take } B = \emptyset\text{). Then}$$

$$P\{(X, Y) \in A\} = \int_{(x,y) \in A} p(x, y) dx dy$$

$$= \int_x p(x) \int_{y \in A_x} p(y|x) dy dx$$

$$= \int_x p(x) \int_{y \in B \cap A_x} p(y|x) dy dx + \int_x p(x)$$

III. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT

A. Identity Management Approach

Identity management on the Internet is hot issue in today. Providing capability of management of distributed identity information over the Internet web site and making it convenient to register id and password and to memorize and use it in many web site are objectives of the Internet identity management. To solve this problem, many approaches have been being tried last years. They are centralized approaches, federated approaches and user centric approaches. The representative centralized approach is Microsoft .Net passport[1].

(2) In the passport solution, a centralized identity provider presents authentication assertion and attribute of users. This approach has problem of monopoly of service and integration of private identity information. Microsoft has dropped the .Net passport service recently. In federated approach, Internet web sites federate and share their users' identity. Different identifiers of one user at different web sites are linked each other by user itself. After the identifiers are linked, authentication is able to be shared among the web sites by exchanging authentication assertion to provide the Single Sign On function. Other identity information such as personal profiles is able to be shared also and the shared attributed information is being used to provide customized service and to keep upto- date information. The representative federated approach is Liberty Alliance ID-FF and ID-WSF specifications[2][3]. With federated approach, user can use the identity management service on the

boundary of federated web sites. A web site accepts only the assertion issued by an IDP or other web site that it has made federation. If the user has not register the IDP, the user can not use the identity service such as SSO on the web site, even though he had registered in some other IDP. It is same situation of credit card. If a store accepts only one kind of credit card, consumer who has some credit cards other than that kind cannot pay with credit card. User centric identity management approach is proposed to overcome the shortcomings of previous approaches and to make the adaptation range bigger. Figure 1 shows the basic concept of user centric identity management. In user centric approach, a user selects an IDP that he wants without the restriction made by whether a web site that the user is visiting has federation relation with the IDP. The user takes some credential that contains some identity information such as authentication assertion or attribute of the person as mentioned in the case of federated approach. After getting the credential from the IDP that he selects, the user submits the credential to a web site at which he wants to use identity service such as SSO and profile sharing. The fact that a user, not a web site selects an IDP gets rid of restriction of identity service use. By the way, a new problem occurs in the user centric approach. That is how a web site trust the information contained in the credential that the user submitted. It is problem of how to trust an IDP that issues the credential. In contrary to the federated approach, the web site doesn't have any relation with the IDP. So the web site doesn't have any criteria for deciding whether it accepts the information contained in the credential or not, in other words, whether it trust the issuer of the credential or not. This is the main problem that this paper intends to present a method to solve. The information contained in a credential is various. Authentication assertion for SSO is one of them. And many types of user attributes are others. Trust of the IDP can be various for the type of information that the IDP issued credential contains. There is the situation that an IDP can be trusted for authentication assertion but it cannot be trusted for providing the user's financial credibility. So the trust of an IDP has to be managed and evaluated for the each type of information that the IDP provides. This paper suggests a method for solving this problem that is management of trust in the user centric identity management. This paper is organized as follows. Section II represents previous work that is related with this problem. The reason of using the term "related" is that there is not any previous research that has tried to solve this problem exactly. In Section III, we propose our approach to solve the problem. The architecture and manner of our method are presented. Finally, we conclude with outlook in Section V.

B. Trust Management Scheme for Cloud Services

Because of the rapid growth in network and communication technology, and the wide spread of various types of computing devices, and the constant availability of services, the security, confidentiality and the reliability are required in such an environment. Devices interact, collect and transfer information with simplicity, and minimal technical expertise without previous introducing to each other. This necessitates a certain concept of security such as trust. In order to maintain a secure, dependable, and reliable environment, a smart security system without or with the least human participation is needed. Therefore, the privacy and security challenges are confronting the security professionals, because in such environments, a chance is available for bad intent entities to launch attacks to others easily [1]. The traditional security models are based on the integration of, authentication, authorization, and access control to provide a secure environment. These traditional solutions can be useful in wired infrastructures. However, they are not efficient in pervasive and wireless infrastructures, due to the dynamic topology of the wireless network that changes quickly, and also the scalability of the wireless networks needs to be considered [2]. Many researchers have been conducted in this field. The previous works used in different methods to achieve the objectives of the trust management system can be briefly summarized as: trust models based on Bayesian approach and probabilistic theory [3][1,11], trust models based on, fuzzy logic [4, 9], Trust model based on Dempster-Shafer and theory of evidence [6], and some approaches based on game theory. Despite this previous effort, the optimum solution is not reached yet. In this paper, we propose a combination of two methods in order to recover the limitations of the existing ones. We proposed trust management scheme by implementing a fusion of support vector machine (SVM) and fuzzy logic. The main motivation of the proposed scheme in using SVM is to predict the optimal relationship values for approximation purpose. Those approximated values then relate the fuzzy basis functions for uncertainty resolving purpose, and then the inference rules are invited for evaluating the trustworthiness of the devices.

Cloud computing [1] [2] is a large-scale distributed computing paradigm in which a pool of abstracted, virtualized, dynamically-scalable, highly available, configurable and reconfigurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, data, etc.) can be provided and released with minimal management effort in the data centers. Services are provided on demand to cloud users over high-speed Internet within the "X as a service (XaaS)" computing framework. It aims at providing users with more flexible services in a transparent manner and with more cheaper and

powerful processors. However, these concentrated resources and data centers obviously present more attractive targets to attackers thus bringing new security issues. But currently, research on cloud computing security is far from being mature [3] [4]. First of all, traditional security mechanisms, like identity validation, digital signature, encryption, firewalls, have been not enough in such ultra-large-scale, open, heterogeneous, totally virtualized cloud computing environment. Moreover, until now, most cloud platforms are heterogeneous, independent, and not interoperable. Many consultants and security agencies have issued warnings on the security threats in the cloud computing model. On the other hand cloud consumers are still wondering whether the cloud is secure before they determine to use the services of cloud providers. And eventual decision of these users mainly hinges on the trust degree with their providers. Therefore, establishing a reasonable and practical model to manage trust is very important and it is also the issue mainly concerned and discussed in this article. To achieve that, two problems should be considered totally. First is how to describe and express the trust level and relation. Due to previous study experience, fuzzy set theory can be used to cope with this problem effectively [5]. The second problem is the difference on trust evaluation attributes of trust objects in cloud computing environment. Therefore our study and remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, TMFC model is introduced including classification, expression, computation of direct trust, connection of recommended trust and incorporation of trust chain. Section III gives the algorithm of TMFC model. Then Section IV gives a simple experiment just to prove the advances of this model on prevent the behavior of associated cheat. Conclusions and some future study work are given in section V.

C. Algorithms

Ideals. Let A be a ring. Recall that an *ideal* a in A is a subset such that a is subgroup of A regarded as a group under addition;

$$a \in a, r \in A \Rightarrow ra \in a$$

The *ideal generated by a subset* S of A is the intersection of all ideals A containing S ---- it is easy to verify that this is in fact an ideal, and that it consist of all finite sums of the form $\sum r_i s_i$ with $r_i \in A, s_i \in S$. When $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_m\}$, we shall write (s_1, \dots, s_m) for the ideal it generates.

Let a and b be ideals in A . The set $\{a+b \mid a \in a, b \in b\}$ is an ideal, denoted by $a+b$. The ideal generated by $\{ab \mid a \in a, b \in b\}$ is denoted by ab . Note that $ab \subset a \cap b$. Clearly ab consists of all finite sums

$\sum a_i b_i$ with $a_i \in a$ and $b_i \in b$, and if $a = (a_1, \dots, a_m)$ and $b = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$, then $ab = (a_1 b_1, \dots, a_i b_j, \dots, a_m b_n)$. Let a be an ideal of A . The set of cosets of a in A forms a ring A/a , and $a \mapsto a+a$ is a homomorphism $\phi: A \mapsto A/a$. The map $b \mapsto \phi^{-1}(b)$ is a one to one correspondence between the ideals of A/a and the ideals of A containing a . An ideal p is *prime* if $p \neq A$ and $ab \in p \Rightarrow a \in p$ or $b \in p$. Thus p is prime if and only if A/p is nonzero and has the property that $ab=0, b \neq 0 \Rightarrow a=0$, i.e., A/p is an integral domain. An ideal m is *maximal* if $m \neq A$ and there does not exist an ideal n contained strictly between m and A . Thus m is maximal if and only if A/m has no proper nonzero ideals, and so is a field. Note that m maximal $\Rightarrow m$ prime. The ideals of $A \times B$ are all of the form $a \times b$, with a and b ideals in A and B . To see this, note that if c is an ideal in $A \times B$ and $(a, b) \in c$, then $(a, 0) = (a, b)(1, 0) \in c$ and $(0, b) = (a, b)(0, 1) \in c$. This shows that $c = a \times b$ with $a = \{a \mid (a, b) \in c \text{ some } b \in b\}$ and $b = \{b \mid (a, b) \in c \text{ some } a \in a\}$

Let A be a ring. An A -algebra is a ring B together with a homomorphism $i_B: A \rightarrow B$. A *homomorphism of A -algebra* $B \rightarrow C$ is a homomorphism of rings $\phi: B \rightarrow C$ such that $\phi(i_B(a)) = i_C(a)$ for all $a \in A$. An A -algebra B is said to be *finitely generated* (or of *finite-type* over A) if there exist elements $x_1, \dots, x_n \in B$ such that every element of B can be expressed as a polynomial in the x_i with coefficients in $i(A)$, i.e., such that the homomorphism $A[X_1, \dots, X_n] \rightarrow B$ sending X_i to x_i is surjective. A ring homomorphism $A \rightarrow B$ is *finite*, and B is finitely generated as an A -module. Let k be a field, and let A be a k -algebra. If $1 \neq 0$ in A , then the map $k \rightarrow A$ is injective, we can identify k with its image, i.e., we can regard k as a subring of A . If $1=0$ in a ring R , the R is the zero ring, i.e., $R = \{0\}$

. Polynomial rings. Let k be a field. A *monomial* in X_1, \dots, X_n is an expression of the form $X_1^{a_1} \dots X_n^{a_n}$, $a_j \in \mathbb{N}$. The *total degree* of the monomial is $\sum a_i$. We sometimes abbreviate it by X^α , $\alpha = (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{N}^n$. The elements of the polynomial ring $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ are finite sums $\sum c_{a_1, \dots, a_n} X_1^{a_1} \dots X_n^{a_n}$, $c_{a_1, \dots, a_n} \in k$, $a_j \in \mathbb{N}$. With the obvious notions of equality, addition and multiplication. Thus the monomials form a basis for $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ as a k -vector space. The ring $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ is an integral domain, and the only units in it are the nonzero constant polynomials. A polynomial $f(X_1, \dots, X_n)$ is *irreducible* if it is nonconstant and has only the obvious factorizations, i.e., $f = gh \Rightarrow g$ or h is constant. **Division in $k[X]$.** The division algorithm allows us to divide a nonzero polynomial into another: let f and g be polynomials in $k[X]$ with $g \neq 0$; then there exist unique polynomials $q, r \in k[X]$ such that $f = qg + r$ with either $r = 0$ or $\deg r < \deg g$. Moreover, there is an algorithm for deciding whether $f \in (g)$, namely, find r and check whether it is zero. Moreover, the Euclidean algorithm allows to pass from finite set of generators for an ideal in $k[X]$ to a single generator by successively replacing each pair of generators with their greatest common divisor.

(Pure) lexicographic ordering (lex). Here monomials are ordered by lexicographic (dictionary) order. More precisely, let $\alpha = (a_1, \dots, a_n)$ and $\beta = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$ be two elements of \mathbb{N}^n ; then $\alpha > \beta$ and $X^\alpha > X^\beta$ (lexicographic ordering) if, in the vector difference $\alpha - \beta \in \mathbb{N}^n$, the left most nonzero entry is positive. For example,

$XY^2 > Y^3Z^4$; $X^3Y^2Z^4 > X^3Y^2Z$. Note that this isn't quite how the dictionary would order them: it would put $XXXXYYYYZZ$ after $XXXXYYZ$. *Graded reverse lexicographic order (grevlex).* Here monomials are ordered by total degree, with ties broken by reverse lexicographic ordering. Thus, $\alpha > \beta$ if $\sum a_i > \sum b_i$, or $\sum a_i = \sum b_i$ and in $\alpha - \beta$ the right most nonzero entry is negative. For example:

$$X^4Y^4Z^7 > X^5Y^5Z^4 \text{ (total degree greater)}$$

$$XY^5Z^2 > X^4YZ^3, \quad X^5YZ > X^4YZ^2$$

Orderings on $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$. Fix an ordering on the monomials in $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$. Then we can write an element f of $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ in a canonical fashion, by re-ordering its elements in decreasing order. For example, we would write
 $f = 4XY^2Z + 4Z^2 - 5X^3 + 7X^2Z^2$
as
 $f = -5X^3 + 7X^2Z^2 + 4XY^2Z + 4Z^2$ (*lex*)
or
 $f = 4XY^2Z + 7X^2Z^2 - 5X^3 + 4Z^2$ (*grevlex*)

Let $\sum a_\alpha X^\alpha \in k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$, in decreasing order:
 $f = a_{\alpha_0} X^{\alpha_0} + a_{\alpha_1} X^{\alpha_1} + \dots$, $\alpha_0 > \alpha_1 > \dots$, $\alpha_0 \neq 0$

Then we define.

- The *multidegree* of f to be $\text{multdeg}(f) = \alpha_0$;
- The *leading coefficient* of f to be $LC(f) = a_{\alpha_0}$;
- The *leading monomial* of f to be $LM(f) = X^{\alpha_0}$;
- The *leading term* of f to be $LT(f) = a_{\alpha_0} X^{\alpha_0}$

For the polynomial $f = 4XY^2Z + \dots$, the multidegree is (1,2,1), the leading coefficient is 4, the leading monomial is XY^2Z , and the leading term is $4XY^2Z$. **The division algorithm in $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$.** Fix a monomial ordering in \mathbb{N}^n . Suppose given a polynomial f and an ordered set (g_1, \dots, g_s) of polynomials; the division algorithm then constructs polynomials a_1, \dots, a_s and r such that $f = a_1g_1 + \dots + a_sg_s + r$ Where either $r = 0$ or no monomial in r is divisible by any of $LT(g_1), \dots, LT(g_s)$. **Step 1:** If $LT(g_1) | LT(f)$, divide g_1 into f to get $f = a_1g_1 + h$, $a_1 = \frac{LT(f)}{LT(g_1)} \in k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$

If $LT(g_1) | LT(h)$, repeat the process until $f = a_1 g_1 + f_1$ (different a_1) with $LT(f_1)$ not divisible by $LT(g_1)$. Now divide g_2 into f_1 , and so on, until $f = a_1 g_1 + \dots + a_s g_s + r_1$ With $LT(r_1)$ not divisible by any $LT(g_1), \dots, LT(g_s)$

Step 2: Rewrite $r_1 = LT(r_1) + r_2$, and repeat Step 1 with r_2 for f :

$f = a_1 g_1 + \dots + a_s g_s + LT(r_1) + r_3$ (different a_i 's) **Monomial ideals.** In general, an ideal a will contain a polynomial without containing the individual terms of the polynomial; for example, the ideal $a = (Y^2 - X^3)$ contains $Y^2 - X^3$ but not Y^2 or X^3 .

DEFINITION 1.5. An ideal a is *monomial* if $\sum c_\alpha X^\alpha \in a \Rightarrow X^\alpha \in a$ all α with $c_\alpha \neq 0$.

PROPOSITION 1.3. Let a be a *monomial ideal*, and let $A = \{\alpha | X^\alpha \in a\}$. Then A satisfies the condition $\alpha \in A, \beta \in \square^n \Rightarrow \alpha + \beta \in A$ (*) And a is the k -subspace of $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ generated by the $X^\alpha, \alpha \in A$. Conversely, if A is a subset of \square^n satisfying (*), then the k -subspace a of $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ generated by $\{X^\alpha | \alpha \in A\}$ is a monomial ideal.

PROOF. It is clear from its definition that a monomial ideal a is the k -subspace of $k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$ generated by the set of monomials it contains. If $X^\alpha \in a$ and $X^\beta \in k[X_1, \dots, X_n]$.

If a permutation is chosen uniformly and at random from the $n!$ possible permutations in S_n , then the counts $C_j^{(n)}$ of cycles of length j are dependent random variables. The joint distribution of $C^{(n)} = (C_1^{(n)}, \dots, C_n^{(n)})$ follows from Cauchy's formula, and is given by

$$P[C^{(n)} = c] = \frac{1}{n!} N(n, c) = 1 \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^n j c_j = n \right\} \prod_{j=1}^n \left(\frac{1}{j} \right)^{c_j} \frac{1}{c_j!}, \quad (1.1)$$

for $c \in \square_+^n$.

Lemma 1.7 For nonnegative integers m_1, \dots, m_n ,

$$E \left(\prod_{j=1}^n (C_j^{(n)})^{[m_j]} \right) = \left(\prod_{j=1}^n \left(\frac{1}{j} \right)^{m_j} \right) 1 \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^n j m_j \leq n \right\} \quad (1.4)$$

Proof. This can be established directly by exploiting cancellation of the form $c_j^{[m_j]} / c_j! = 1 / (c_j - m_j)!$ when $c_j \geq m_j$, which occurs between the ingredients in Cauchy's formula and the falling factorials in the moments. Write $m = \sum j m_j$. Then, with the first sum indexed by $c = (c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \square_+^n$ and the last sum indexed by $d = (d_1, \dots, d_n) \in \square_+^n$ via the correspondence $d_j = c_j - m_j$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} E \left(\prod_{j=1}^n (C_j^{(n)})^{[m_j]} \right) &= \sum_c P[C^{(n)} = c] \prod_{j=1}^n (c_j)^{[m_j]} \\ &= \sum_{c: c_j \geq m_j \text{ for all } j} 1 \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^n j c_j = n \right\} \prod_{j=1}^n \frac{(c_j)^{[m_j]}}{j^{c_j} c_j!} \\ &= \prod_{j=1}^n \frac{1}{j^{m_j}} \sum_d 1 \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^n j d_j = n - m \right\} \prod_{j=1}^n \frac{1}{j^{d_j} (d_j)!} \end{aligned}$$

This last sum simplifies to the indicator $1(m \leq n)$, corresponding to the fact that if $n - m \geq 0$, then $d_j = 0$ for $j > n - m$, and a random permutation in S_{n-m} must have some cycle structure (d_1, \dots, d_{n-m}) . The moments of $C_j^{(n)}$ follow immediately as

$$E(C_j^{(n)})^{[r]} = j^{-r} 1\{jr \leq n\} \quad (1.2)$$

We note for future reference that (1.4) can also be written in the form

$$E \left(\prod_{j=1}^n (C_j^{(n)})^{[m_j]} \right) = E \left(\prod_{j=1}^n Z_j^{[m_j]} \right) 1 \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^n j m_j \leq n \right\}, \quad (1.3)$$

Where the Z_j are independent Poisson-distribution random variables that satisfy $E(Z_j) = 1/j$

The marginal distribution of cycle counts provides a formula for the joint distribution of the cycle counts C_j^n , we find the distribution of C_j^n using a combinatorial approach combined with the inclusion-exclusion formula.

Lemma 1.8. For $1 \leq j \leq n$,

$$P[C_j^{(n)} = k] = \frac{j^{-k}}{k!} \sum_{l=0}^{[n/j]-k} (-1)^l \frac{j^{-l}}{l!} \quad (1.1)$$

Proof. Consider the set I of all possible cycles of length j , formed with elements chosen from $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$, so that $|I| = n^{[j]}/j$. For each $\alpha \in I$, consider the “property” G_α of having α ; that is, G_α is the set of permutations $\pi \in S_n$ such that α is one of the cycles of π . We then have $|G_\alpha| = (n-j)!$, since the elements of $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ not in α must be permuted among themselves. To use the inclusion-exclusion formula we need to calculate the term S_r , which is the sum of the probabilities of the r -fold intersection of properties, summing over all sets of r distinct properties. There are two cases to consider. If the r properties are indexed by r cycles having no elements in common, then the intersection specifies how rj elements are moved by the permutation, and there are $(n-rj)!(rj \leq n)$ permutations in the intersection. There are $n^{[rj]}/(j^r r!)$ such intersections. For the other case, some two distinct properties name some element in common, so no permutation can have both these properties, and the r -fold intersection is empty. Thus

$$S_r = (n-rj)!(rj \leq n) \times \frac{n^{[rj]} 1}{j^r r! n!} = 1(rj \leq n) \frac{1}{j^r r!}$$

Finally, the inclusion-exclusion series for the number of permutations having exactly k properties is

$$\sum_{l \geq 0} (-1)^l \binom{k+l}{l} S_{k+l}$$

Which simplifies to (1.1) Returning to the original hat-check problem, we substitute $j=1$ in (1.1) to obtain the distribution of the number of fixed points of a random permutation. For $k = 0, 1, \dots, n$,

$$P[C_1^{(n)} = k] = \frac{1}{k!} \sum_{l=0}^{n-k} (-1)^l \frac{1}{l!}, \quad (1.2)$$

and the moments of $C_1^{(n)}$ follow from (1.2) with $j=1$. In particular, for $n \geq 2$, the mean and variance of $C_1^{(n)}$ are both equal to 1. The joint distribution of $(C_1^{(n)}, \dots, C_b^{(n)})$ for any $1 \leq b \leq n$ has an expression similar to (1.7); this too can be derived by inclusion-exclusion. For any $c = (c_1, \dots, c_b) \in \square_+^b$ with $m = \sum c_i$,

$$P[(C_1^{(n)}, \dots, C_b^{(n)}) = c] = \left\{ \prod_{i=1}^b \left(\frac{1}{i} \right)^{c_i} \frac{1}{c_i!} \right\} \sum_{\substack{l \geq 0 \text{ with} \\ \sum i l_i \leq n-m}} (-1)^{l_1 + \dots + l_b} \prod_{i=1}^b \left(\frac{1}{i} \right)^{l_i} \frac{1}{l_i!} \quad (1.3)$$

The joint moments of the first b counts $C_1^{(n)}, \dots, C_b^{(n)}$ can be obtained directly from (1.2) and (1.3) by setting $m_{b+1} = \dots = m_n = 0$

The limit distribution of cycle counts

It follows immediately from Lemma 1.2 that for each fixed j , as $n \rightarrow \infty$,

$$P[C_j^{(n)} = k] \rightarrow \frac{j^{-k}}{k!} e^{-1/j}, \quad k = 0, 1, 2, \dots,$$

So that $C_j^{(n)}$ converges in distribution to a random variable Z_j having a Poisson distribution with mean $1/j$; we use the notation $C_j^{(n)} \rightarrow_d Z_j$ where $Z_j \square P_o(1/j)$ to describe this. Infact, the limit random variables are independent.

Theorem 1.6 The process of cycle counts converges in distribution to a Poisson process of \square with intensity j^{-1} . That is, as $n \rightarrow \infty$,

$$(C_1^{(n)}, C_2^{(n)}, \dots) \rightarrow_d (Z_1, Z_2, \dots) \quad (1.1)$$

Where the $Z_j, j=1, 2, \dots$, are independent Poisson-distributed random variables with

$$E(Z_j) = \frac{1}{j}$$

Proof. To establish the converges in distribution one shows that for each fixed $b \geq 1$, as $n \rightarrow \infty$,

$$P[(C_1^{(n)}, \dots, C_b^{(n)}) = c] \rightarrow P[(Z_1, \dots, Z_b) = c]$$

Error rates

The proof of Theorem says nothing about the rate of convergence. Elementary analysis can be used to estimate this rate when $b=1$. Using properties of alternating series with decreasing terms, for $k = 0, 1, \dots, n$,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{k!} \left(\frac{1}{(n-k+1)!} - \frac{1}{(n-k+2)!} \right) &\leq |P[C_1^{(n)} = k] - P[Z_1 = k]| \\ &\leq \frac{1}{k!(n-k+1)!} \end{aligned}$$

It follows that

$$\frac{2^{n+1}}{(n+1)!} \frac{n}{n+2} \leq \sum_{k=0}^n |P[C_1^{(n)} = k] - P[Z_1 = k]| \leq \frac{2^{n+1} - 1}{(n+1)!} \quad (1.11)$$

Since

$$P[Z_1 > n] = \frac{e^{-1}}{(n+1)!} \left(1 + \frac{1}{n+2} + \frac{1}{(n+2)(n+3)} + \dots\right) < \frac{1}{(n+1)!}$$

We see from (1.11) that the total variation distance between the distribution $L(C_1^{(n)})$ of $C_1^{(n)}$ and the distribution $L(Z_1)$ of Z_1

D. Node Based Trust Management in Mobile AdHoc Networks

Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are dynamically configured, multi-hop wireless networks with varying topology. Due to the unique characteristics of MANETs and the inherent unreliable nature of the wireless medium, the concept of trust in MANETs should be carefully defined. A trust management framework for MANETs cannot assume that all nodes are cooperative. In resource-restricted environments, selfishness is more likely to be prevalent over cooperation. Trust is also context-dependent, i.e. A may trust B as a doctor but not as a plumber. The main problems that we address in this paper are the following: (a) to define a metric that the nodes can use to make decisions on whether to establish keys with other nodes in an ad-hoc network, given that the infrastructure for establishing such keys exists, and (b) to define a trust management scheme in which nodes in a MANET can securely group together in order to trust each other. We also propose a node-based trust management system architecture, the relevant algorithms and proof of correctness to analyse the phases of this scheme. Our proposed management scheme is based on a clustered wireless mobile sensor network with backbone and on a mobile agent system; it introduces a trust of a node within local management strategy with help from the mobile agents running on each node. That is, a node's trust-based information is stored as a history on the node itself and managed by the local mobile agent of the node. This paper is organized as follows: Section II depicts some related work in introducing trust and security in MANETs. Section III describes the work on the theory of trust formalization and node-based trust management (NTM) scheme. Section IV illustrates our proposed Scheme with notations and definitions along with proof of correctness. Section V depicts the analytical part of NTM with the system architecture and relevant algorithms. Finally section VI concludes the paper.

Establish the asymptotics of $P[A_n(C^{(n)})]$ under conditions (A_0) and (B_{01}) , where

$$A_n(C^{(n)}) = \bigcap_{1 \leq i \leq n} \bigcap_{r_i + 1 \leq j \leq r_i} \{C_{ij}^{(n)} = 0\},$$

and $\zeta_i = (r_i' / r_{id}') - 1 = O(i^{-g'})$ as $i \rightarrow \infty$, for some $g' > 0$. We start with the expression

$$P[A_n(C^{(n)})] = \frac{P[T_{0m}(Z') = n]}{P[T_{0m}(Z) = n]} \prod_{\substack{1 \leq i \leq n \\ r_i + 1 \leq j \leq r_i}} \left\{1 - \frac{\theta}{ir_i} (1 + E_{i0})\right\} \quad (1.1)$$

$$P[T_{0n}(Z') = n] = \frac{\theta d}{n} \exp \left\{ \sum_{i \geq 1} [\log(1 + i^{-1} \theta d) - i^{-1} \theta d] \right\} \left\{1 + O(n^{-1} \varphi_{\{1,2,7\}}'(n))\right\} \quad (1.2)$$

and

$$P[T_{0n}(Z) = n] = \frac{\theta d}{n} \exp \left\{ \sum_{i \geq 1} [\log(1 + i^{-1} \theta d) - i^{-1} \theta d] \right\} \left\{1 + O(n^{-1} \varphi_{\{1,2,7\}}(n))\right\} \quad (1.3)$$

Where $\varphi_{\{1,2,7\}}'(n)$ refers to the quantity derived from Z' . It thus follows that $P[A_n(C^{(n)})] \square Kn^{-\theta(1-d)}$ for a constant K , depending on Z and the r_i' and computable explicitly from (1.1) – (1.3), if Conditions (A_0) and (B_{01}) are satisfied and if $\zeta_i^* = O(i^{-g'})$ from some $g' > 0$, since, under these circumstances, both $n^{-1} \varphi_{\{1,2,7\}}'(n)$ and $n^{-1} \varphi_{\{1,2,7\}}(n)$ tend to zero as $n \rightarrow \infty$. In particular, for polynomials and square free polynomials, the relative error in this asymptotic approximation is of order n^{-1} if $g' > 1$.

For $0 \leq b \leq n/8$ and $n \geq n_0$, with n_0

$$d_{TV}(L(C[1,b]), L(Z[1,b])) \leq d_{TV}(L(C[1,b]), L(Z[1,b])) \leq \varepsilon_{\{7,7\}}(n,b),$$

Where $\varepsilon_{\{7,7\}}(n,b) = O(b/n)$ under Conditions $(A_0), (D_1)$ and (B_{11}) . Since, by the Conditioning Relation,

$$L(C[1,b] | T_{0b}(C) = l) = L(Z[1,b] | T_{0b}(Z) = l),$$

It follows by direct calculation that

$$\begin{aligned}
 & d_{TV}(L(C[1,b]), L(Z[1,b])) \\
 &= d_{TV}(L(T_{0b}(C)), L(T_{0b}(Z))) \\
 &= \max_A \sum_{r \in A} P[T_{0b}(Z) = r] \\
 & \left\{ 1 - \frac{P[T_{bn}(Z) = n-r]}{P[T_{0n}(Z) = n]} \right\} \quad (1.4)
 \end{aligned}$$

Suppressing the argument Z from now on, we thus obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
 & d_{TV}(L(C[1,b]), L(Z[1,b])) \\
 &= \sum_{r \geq 0} P[T_{0b} = r] \left\{ 1 - \frac{P[T_{bn} = n-r]}{P[T_{0n} = n]} \right\}_+ \\
 &\leq \sum_{r > n/2} P[T_{0b} = r] + \sum_{r=0}^{[n/2]} \frac{P[T_{0b} = r]}{P[T_{0b} = n]} \\
 &\times \left\{ \sum_{s=0}^n P[T_{0b} = s] (P[T_{bn} = n-s] - P[T_{bn} = n-r]) \right\}_+ \\
 &\leq \sum_{r > n/2} P[T_{0b} = r] + \sum_{r=0}^{[n/2]} P[T_{0b} = r] \\
 &\times \sum_{s=0}^{[n/2]} P[T_{0b} = s] \frac{\{P[T_{bn} = n-s] - P[T_{bn} = n-r]\}}{P[T_{0n} = n]} \\
 &+ \sum_{s=0}^{[n/2]} P[T_{0b} = r] \sum_{s=[n/2]+1}^n P[T = s] P[T_{bn} = n-s] / P[T_{0n} = n]
 \end{aligned}$$

The first sum is at most $2n^{-1}ET_{0b}$; the third is bound by

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \left(\max_{n/2 < s \leq n} P[T_{0b} = s] \right) / P[T_{0n} = n] \\
 &\leq \frac{2\varepsilon_{\{10.5(1)\}}(n/2, b)}{n} \frac{3n}{\theta P_\theta[0,1]}, \\
 &\frac{3n}{\theta P_\theta[0,1]} 4n^{-2} \phi_{\{10.8\}}^*(n) \sum_{r=0}^{[n/2]} P[T_{0b} = r] \sum_{s=0}^{[n/2]} P[T_{0b} = s] \frac{1}{2} |r-s| \\
 &\leq \frac{12\phi_{\{10.8\}}^*(n)}{\theta P_\theta[0,1]} \frac{ET_{0b}}{n}
 \end{aligned}$$

Hence we may take

$$\begin{aligned}
 \varepsilon_{\{7.7\}}(n, b) &= 2n^{-1}ET_{0b}(Z) \left\{ 1 + \frac{6\phi_{\{10.8\}}^*(n)}{\theta P_\theta[0,1]} \right\} P \\
 &+ \frac{6}{\theta P_\theta[0,1]} \varepsilon_{\{10.5(1)\}}(n/2, b) \quad (1.5)
 \end{aligned}$$

Required order under Conditions $(A_0), (D_1)$ and (B_{11}) , if $S(\infty) < \infty$. If not, $\phi_{\{10.8\}}^*(n)$ can be

replaced by $\phi_{\{10.11\}}^*(n)$ in the above, which has the required order, without the restriction on the r_i implied by $S(\infty) < \infty$. Examining the Conditions $(A_0), (D_1)$ and (B_{11}) , it is perhaps surprising to find that (B_{11}) is required instead of just (B_{01}) ; that is, that we should need $\sum_{l \geq 2} l\varepsilon_{il} = O(i^{-a_1})$

to hold for some $a_1 > 1$. A first observation is that a similar problem arises with the rate of decay of ε_{il}

as well. For this reason, n_1 is replaced by n_1 . This makes it possible to replace condition (A_1) by the weaker pair of conditions (A_0) and (D_1) in the eventual assumptions needed for $\varepsilon_{\{7.7\}}(n, b)$ to be

of order $O(b/n)$; the decay rate requirement of order $i^{-1-\gamma}$ is shifted from ε_{il} itself to its first difference. This is needed to obtain the right approximation error for the random mappings example. However, since all the classical applications make far more stringent assumptions about the $\varepsilon_{il}, l \geq 2$, than are made in (B_{11}) . The critical point of the proof is seen where the initial estimate of the difference

$P[T_{bn}^{(m)} = s] - P[T_{bn}^{(m)} = s+1]$. The factor $\varepsilon_{\{10.10\}}(n)$, which should be small, contains a far tail element from n_1 of the form $\phi_1^\theta(n) + u_1^*(n)$, which is only small if $a_1 > 1$, being otherwise of order $O(n^{1-a_1+\delta})$ for any $\delta > 0$, since $a_2 > 1$ is in any case assumed. For $s \geq n/2$, this gives rise to a contribution of order $O(n^{-1-a_1+\delta})$ in the estimate of the difference $P[T_{bn} = s] - P[T_{bn} = s+1]$, which, in the remainder of the proof, is translated into a contribution of order $O(n^{-1-a_1+\delta})$ for differences of the form $P[T_{bn} = s] - P[T_{bn} = s+1]$, finally leading to a contribution of order $bn^{-a_1+\delta}$ for any $\delta > 0$ in $\varepsilon_{\{7.7\}}(n, b)$. Some improvement would seem to be possible, defining the function g by $g(w) = 1_{\{w=s\}} - 1_{\{w=s+t\}}$, differences that are of the form $P[T_{bn} = s] - P[T_{bn} = s+t]$ can be directly estimated, at a cost of only a single contribution of the form $\phi_1^\theta(n) + u_1^*(n)$. Then, iterating the cycle, in which one estimate of a

difference in point probabilities is improved to an estimate of smaller order, a bound of the form $|P[T_{bn} = s] - P[T_{bn} = s + t]| = O(n^{-2}t + n^{-1-a+\delta})$ for any $\delta > 0$ could perhaps be attained, leading to a final error estimate in order $O(bn^{-1} + n^{-a+\delta})$ for any $\delta > 0$, to replace $\varepsilon_{\{7,7\}}(n, b)$. This would be of the ideal order $O(b/n)$ for large enough b , but would still be coarser for small b .

With b and n as in the previous section, we wish to show that

$$\left| d_{TV}(L(C[1, b]), L(Z[1, b])) - \frac{1}{2}(n+1)^{-1} |1 - \theta| E|T_{0b} - ET_{0b}| \right| \leq \varepsilon_{\{7,8\}}(n, b),$$

Where $\varepsilon_{\{7,8\}}(n, b) = O(n^{-1}b[n^{-1}b + n^{-\beta_{12}+\delta}])$ for any $\delta > 0$ under Conditions $(A_0), (D_1)$ and (B_{12}) , with β_{12} . The proof uses sharper estimates. As before, we begin with the formula

$$d_{TV}(L(C[1, b]), L(Z[1, b])) = \sum_{r \geq 0} P[T_{0b} = r] \left\{ 1 - \frac{P[T_{bn} = n - r]}{P[T_{0n} = n]} \right\}_+$$

Now we observe that

$$\left| \sum_{r \geq 0} P[T_{0b} = r] \left\{ 1 - \frac{P[T_{bn} = n - r]}{P[T_{0n} = n]} \right\}_+ - \sum_{r=0}^{[n/2]} \frac{P[T_{0b} = r]}{P[T_{0n} = n]} \right| \times \left| \sum_{s=[n/2]+1}^n P[T_{0b} = s] (P[T_{bn} = n - s] - P[T_{bn} = n - r]) \right| \leq 4n^{-2}ET_{0b}^2 + (\max_{n/2 < s \leq n} P[T_{0b} = s]) / P[T_{0n} = n] + P\{T_{0b} > n/2\} \leq 8n^{-2}ET_{0b}^2 + \frac{3\varepsilon_{\{10,5(2)\}}(n/2, b)}{\theta P_\theta[0, 1]}, \quad (1.1)$$

We have

$$\left| \sum_{r=0}^{[n/2]} \frac{P[T_{0b} = r]}{P[T_{0n} = n]} \times \left(\sum_{s=0}^{[n/2]} P[T_{0b} = s] (P[T_{bn} = n - s] - P[T_{bn} = n - r]) \right)_+ - \left\{ \sum_{s=0}^{[n/2]} P[T_{0b} = s] \frac{(s-r)(1-\theta)}{n+1} P[T_{0n} = n] \right\}_+ \right| \leq \frac{1}{n^2 P[T_{0n} = n]} \sum_{r \geq 0} P[T_{0b} = r] \sum_{s \geq 0} P[T_{0b} = s] |s - r| \times \left\{ \varepsilon_{\{10,14\}}(n, b) + 2(r \vee s) |1 - \theta| n^{-1} \left\{ K_0 \theta + 4\phi_{\{10,8\}}^*(n) \right\} \right\} \leq \frac{6}{\theta n P_\theta[0, 1]} ET_{0b} \varepsilon_{\{10,14\}}(n, b) + 4 |1 - \theta| n^{-2} ET_{0b}^2 \left\{ K_0 \theta + 4\phi_{\{10,8\}}^*(n) \right\} \left(\frac{3}{\theta n P_\theta[0, 1]} \right), \quad (1.2)$$

The approximation in (1.2) is further simplified by noting that

$$\sum_{r=0}^{[n/2]} P[T_{0b} = r] \left\{ \sum_{s=0}^{[n/2]} P[T_{0b} = s] \frac{(s-r)(1-\theta)}{n+1} \right\}_+ - \left\{ \sum_{s=0}^{[n/2]} P[T_{0b} = s] \frac{(s-r)(1-\theta)}{n+1} \right\}_+ \leq \sum_{r=0}^{[n/2]} P[T_{0b} = r] \sum_{s > [n/2]} P[T_{0b} = s] \frac{(s-r)|1-\theta|}{n+1} \leq |1 - \theta| n^{-1} E(T_{0b} 1\{T_{0b} > n/2\}) \leq 2 |1 - \theta| n^{-2} ET_{0b}^2, \quad (1.3)$$

and then by observing that

$$\sum_{r > [n/2]} P[T_{0b} = r] \left\{ \sum_{s \geq 0} P[T_{0b} = s] \frac{(s-r)(1-\theta)}{n+1} \right\} \leq n^{-1} |1 - \theta| (ET_{0b} P\{T_{0b} > n/2\} + E(T_{0b} 1\{T_{0b} > n/2\})) \leq 4 |1 - \theta| n^{-2} ET_{0b}^2 \quad (1.4)$$

Combining the contributions of (1.2) –(1.3), we thus find

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \left| d_{TV}(L(C[1,b]), L(Z[1,b])) \right. \\
 & \left. - (n+1)^{-1} \sum_{r \geq 0} P[T_{ob} = r] \left\{ \sum_{s \geq 0} P[T_{ob} = s](s-r)(1-\theta) \right\}_+ \right| \\
 & \leq \varepsilon_{\{7.8\}}(n, b) \\
 & = \frac{3}{\theta P_\theta[0,1]} \left\{ \varepsilon_{\{10.5(2)\}}(n/2, b) + 2n^{-1} E T_{ob} \varepsilon_{\{10.14\}}(n, b) \right\} \\
 & + 2n^{-2} E T_{ob}^2 \left\{ 4 + 3|1-\theta| + \frac{24|1-\theta| \phi_{\{10.8\}}^*(n)}{\theta P_\theta[0,1]} \right\} \quad (1.5)
 \end{aligned}$$

The quantity $\varepsilon_{\{7.8\}}(n, b)$ is seen to be of the order claimed under Conditions (A_0) , (D_1) and (B_{12}) , provided that $S(\infty) < \infty$; this supplementary condition can be removed if $\phi_{\{10.8\}}^*(n)$ is replaced by $\phi_{\{10.11\}}^*(n)$ in the definition of $\varepsilon_{\{7.8\}}(n, b)$, has the required order without the restriction on the r_i implied by assuming that $S(\infty) < \infty$. Finally, a direct calculation now shows that

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \sum_{r \geq 0} P[T_{ob} = r] \left\{ \sum_{s \geq 0} P[T_{ob} = s](s-r)(1-\theta) \right\}_+ \\
 & = \frac{1}{2} |1-\theta| E |T_{ob} - E T_{ob}|
 \end{aligned}$$

E. Trust Management in Cloud Computing Software as a Service, Platform as a Service and Infrastructure as a Service

The field of trust management has made several important contributions to improving the management of protection and quality of service in distributed systems. It has refined the notion of access control by relating protection to a prediction of the actions of an entity, in addition to its identity. It has enabled systems to gracefully handle requests from strangers, both by securely exchanging recommendations or credentials among trusted peers, and by building trust over time, while managing risk. It has enlarged the scope of protection, enabling all interacting peers to manage their protection, not just professionally administered servers. And it has successfully applied trust models and mechanisms both for making decisions concerning protection and concerning quality of service assurances. Nevertheless, some issues remain to be addressed. Different trust models have arisen in different problem domains, and a general trust model that is applicable across domains is missing. Furthermore, even within a domain, trust models have often been developed to address a specific problem or application, thus lacking the generality to be applicable to richer scenarios. For

widespread use of trust management and for users to adopt trust management models, models must be useful in multiple scenarios. A single user usually has multiple diverse needs that can potentially benefit from trust management. It makes sense for one trust model to be able to handle the diverse scenarios that the user may come across since the user might find it unfeasible and time consuming to manage an independent trust model for each of his needs. Hence, a general model that is able to deal with diverse scenarios is essential to making trust management attractive for the user. In this paper, we present General Trust Management (GTM) that is applicable in multiple problem scenarios. GTM is a generalization of Trust in Smart Spaces (TISS), a trust model that targets smart space scenarios which will be published elsewhere. The generalization is performed with attention to preserving the richness of TISS. GTM targets generality while it handles multi-link trust decisions, stereotyping by dividing participants into user defined classes, and personalization through the use privacy policies. GTM's generality is demonstrated by applying it diverse problem scenarios, namely packet routing, content management and service provision. In Section II, the main features of TISS are summarized. Section III details GTM's usage modes and handling of trust management functions. Section IV demonstrates GTM's generality by applying it to diverse problem scenarios. Section V presents related work and discussion. Finally, Section VI presents the conclusion. Cloud computing is the next generation paradigm for sharing computation or storage resources. It successfully uses information technology as a service over the network and can provide end-users with extremely strong computation capability and huge memory space while with low cost. But due to the reasons that cloud computing involves many kinds of former IT technologies, researchers working on it are from various backgrounds and existing cloud deployments lack large scale usage, till now there is still no widely accepted definition for it. According to the different forms of provision of services, cloud computing can be seen as SaaS (Software as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service) or even IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service). A well described definition can be as follows: cloud computing is a set of network enabled services, providing scalable, QoS guaranteed, normally personalized, inexpensive computing infrastructures on demand, which could be accessed in a simple and pervasive way. Now security has become the biggest issue which constrains the large scale deployment and usage of cloud computing. Since cloud computing has many unique features compared to traditional technologies, such as it is ultra-largescale and resources belong to each cloud providers are completely distributed, heterogeneous and totally virtualized, unmodified traditional security

mechanisms can no longer be used in clouds. Also traditional IT security models are no longer suitable for clouds. Trust mechanism can establish entities' relationship quickly and safe in distributed systems and has been proven to be an effective substitute means for traditional security mechanisms [8-11]. However trust is extremely abstract, subjective, uncertainty, time and context-sensitive, it is very difficult to be measured and managed. Many scholars designed their trust model or trust mechanisms for distributed environments.. However there still lacks a perfect and widely-accepted trust model which is designed specifically for cloud or cross-clouds environment. This paper first proposed a novel domain-based trust model to ensure the security and interoperability of cloud and cross-clouds environment. After that, it introduced a novel security framework with an independent trust management module on top of traditional security modules. Using the new security model, it put forward some trustbased security strategies for the safety of both cloud customers and providers. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: part II describes the related works and part III introduces the proposed trust model. Part IV introduces a new security model with trust management module and discusses some trust-based security mechanisms. Part V shows the results of simulation experiments and the last part is conclusion and future work.

Example 1.0. Consider the point $O = (0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{R}^n$. For an arbitrary vector r , the coordinates of the point $x = O + r$ are equal to the respective coordinates of the vector $r: x = (x^1, \dots, x^n)$ and $r = (x^1, \dots, x^n)$. The vector r such as in the example is called the position vector or the radius vector of the point x . (Or, in greater detail: r is the radius-vector of x w.r.t an origin O). Points are frequently specified by their radius-vectors. This presupposes the choice of O as the "standard origin". Let us summarize. We have considered \mathbb{R}^n and interpreted its elements in two ways: as points and as vectors. Hence we may say that we leading with the two copies of $\mathbb{R}^n: \mathbb{R}^n = \{\text{points}\}, \mathbb{R}^n = \{\text{vectors}\}$

Operations with vectors: multiplication by a number, addition. Operations with points and vectors: adding a vector to a point (giving a point), subtracting two points (giving a vector). \mathbb{R}^n treated in this way is called an *n-dimensional affine space*. (An "abstract" affine space is a pair of sets, the set of points and the set of vectors so that the operations as above are defined axiomatically). Notice that vectors in an affine space are also known as "free vectors". Intuitively, they are not fixed at points and "float freely" in space. From \mathbb{R}^n considered as an affine space we can precede in two opposite directions: \mathbb{R}^n as an Euclidean space $\leftarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ as an

affine space $\Rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ as a manifold. Going to the left means introducing some extra structure which will make the geometry richer. Going to the right means forgetting about part of the affine structure; going further in this direction will lead us to the so-called "smooth (or differentiable) manifolds". The theory of differential forms does not require any extra geometry. So our natural direction is to the right. The Euclidean structure, however, is useful for examples and applications. So let us say a few words about it:

Remark 1.0. *Euclidean geometry.* In \mathbb{R}^n considered as an affine space we can already do a good deal of geometry. For example, we can consider lines and planes, and quadric surfaces like an ellipsoid. However, we cannot discuss such things as "lengths", "angles" or "areas" and "volumes". To be able to do so, we have to introduce some more definitions, making \mathbb{R}^n a Euclidean space. Namely, we define the length of a vector $a = (a^1, \dots, a^n)$ to be

$$|a| := \sqrt{(a^1)^2 + \dots + (a^n)^2} \quad (1)$$

After that we can also define distances between points as follows:

$$d(A, B) := |\overline{AB}| \quad (2)$$

One can check that the distance so defined possesses natural properties that we expect: is it always non-negative and equals zero only for coinciding points; the distance from A to B is the same as that from B to A (symmetry); also, for three points, A, B and C, we have $d(A, B) \leq d(A, C) + d(C, B)$ (the "triangle inequality"). To define angles, we first introduce the scalar product of two vectors

$$(a, b) := a^1 b^1 + \dots + a^n b^n \quad (3)$$

Thus $|a| = \sqrt{(a, a)}$. The scalar product is also denote by dot: $a \cdot b = (a, b)$, and hence is often referred to as the "dot product". Now, for nonzero vectors, we define the angle between them by the equality

$$\cos \alpha := \frac{(a, b)}{|a||b|} \quad (4)$$

The angle itself is defined up to an integral multiple of 2π . For this definition to be consistent we have to ensure that the r.h.s. of (4) does not exceed 1 by the absolute value. This follows from the inequality

$$(a, b)^2 \leq |a|^2 |b|^2 \quad (5)$$

known as the Cauchy–Bunyakovsky–Schwarz inequality (various combinations of these three names are applied in different books). One of the ways of proving (5) is to consider the scalar square

of the linear combination $a + tb$, where $t \in \mathbb{R}$. As $(a + tb, a + tb) \geq 0$ is a quadratic polynomial in t which is never negative, its discriminant must be less or equal zero. Writing this explicitly yields (5). The triangle inequality for distances also follows from the inequality (5).

Example 1.1. Consider the function $f(x) = x^i$ (the i -th coordinate). The linear function dx^i (the differential of x^i) applied to an arbitrary vector h is simply h^i . From these examples follows that we can rewrite df as

$$df = \frac{\partial f}{\partial x^1} dx^1 + \dots + \frac{\partial f}{\partial x^n} dx^n, \quad (1)$$

which is the standard form. Once again: the partial derivatives in (1) are just the coefficients (depending on x); dx^1, dx^2, \dots are linear functions giving on an arbitrary vector h its coordinates h^1, h^2, \dots , respectively. Hence

$$df(x)(h) = \partial_{hf(x)} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial x^1} h^1 + \dots + \frac{\partial f}{\partial x^n} h^n, \quad (2)$$

Theorem 1.7. Suppose we have a parametrized curve $t \mapsto x(t)$ passing through $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}^n$ at $t = t_0$ and with the velocity vector $x'(t_0) = v$. Then $\frac{df(x(t))}{dt}(t_0) = \partial_v f(x_0) = df(x_0)(v)$ (1)

Proof. Indeed, consider a small increment of the parameter $t : t_0 \mapsto t_0 + \Delta t$, Where $\Delta t \mapsto 0$. On the other hand, we have $f(x_0 + h) - f(x_0) = df(x_0)(h) + \beta(h)|h|$ for an arbitrary vector h , where $\beta(h) \rightarrow 0$ when $h \rightarrow 0$. Combining it together, for the increment of $f(x(t))$ we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} & f(x(t_0 + \Delta t)) - f(x_0) \\ &= df(x_0)(v \cdot \Delta t + \alpha(\Delta t) \Delta t) \\ &+ \beta(v \cdot \Delta t + \alpha(\Delta t) \Delta t) \cdot |v \Delta t + \alpha(\Delta t) \Delta t| \\ &= df(x_0)(v) \cdot \Delta t + \gamma(\Delta t) \Delta t \end{aligned}$$

For a certain $\gamma(\Delta t)$ such that $\gamma(\Delta t) \rightarrow 0$ when $\Delta t \rightarrow 0$ (we used the linearity of $df(x_0)$). By the

definition, this means that the derivative of $f(x(t))$ at $t = t_0$ is exactly $df(x_0)(v)$. The statement of the theorem can be expressed by a simple formula:

$$\frac{df(x(t))}{dt} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial x^1} x^1 + \dots + \frac{\partial f}{\partial x^n} x^n \quad (2)$$

To calculate the value Of df at a point x_0 on a given vector v one can take an arbitrary curve passing Through x_0 at t_0 with v as the velocity vector at t_0 and calculate the usual derivative of $f(x(t))$ at $t = t_0$.

Theorem 1.8. For functions $f, g : U \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, $U \subset \mathbb{R}^n$,

$$d(f + g) = df + dg \quad (1)$$

$$d(fg) = df \cdot g + f \cdot dg \quad (2)$$

Proof. Consider an arbitrary point x_0 and an arbitrary vector v stretching from it. Let a curve $x(t)$ be such that $x(t_0) = x_0$ and $x'(t_0) = v$. Hence

$$d(f + g)(x_0)(v) = \frac{d}{dt}(f(x(t)) + g(x(t)))$$

at $t = t_0$ and

$$d(fg)(x_0)(v) = \frac{d}{dt}(f(x(t))g(x(t)))$$

at $t = t_0$. Formulae (1) and (2) then immediately follow from the corresponding formulae for the usual derivative. Now, almost without change the theory generalizes to functions taking values in \mathbb{R}^m instead of \mathbb{R} . The only difference is that now the differential of a map $F : U \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ at a point x will be a linear function taking vectors in \mathbb{R}^n to vectors in \mathbb{R}^m (instead of \mathbb{R}). For an arbitrary vector $h \in \mathbb{R}^n$,

$$F(x + h) = F(x) + dF(x)(h) + \beta(h)|h| \quad (3)$$

Where $\beta(h) \rightarrow 0$ when $h \rightarrow 0$. We have $dF = (dF^1, \dots, dF^m)$ and

$$dF = \frac{\partial F}{\partial x^1} dx^1 + \dots + \frac{\partial F}{\partial x^n} dx^n$$

$$= \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial F^1}{\partial x^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial F^1}{\partial x^n} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \frac{\partial F^m}{\partial x^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial F^m}{\partial x^n} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} dx^1 \\ \dots \\ dx^n \end{pmatrix} \quad (4)$$

In this matrix notation we have to write vectors as vector-columns.

Theorem 1.9. For an arbitrary parametrized curve $x(t)$ in \square^n , the differential of a map $F: U \rightarrow \square^m$ (where $U \subset \square^n$) maps the velocity vector $\dot{x}(t)$ to the velocity vector of the curve $F(x(t))$ in \square^m :

$$\frac{dF(x(t))}{dt} = dF(x(t))(\dot{x}(t)) \quad (1)$$

Proof. By the definition of the velocity vector,

$$x(t + \Delta t) = x(t) + \dot{x}(t) \cdot \Delta t + \alpha(\Delta t) \Delta t \quad (2)$$

Where $\alpha(\Delta t) \rightarrow 0$ when $\Delta t \rightarrow 0$. By the definition of the differential,

$$F(x + h) = F(x) + dF(x)(h) + \beta(h) |h| \quad (3)$$

Where $\beta(h) \rightarrow 0$ when $h \rightarrow 0$. we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} F(x(t + \Delta t)) &= F(x + \underbrace{\dot{x}(t) \Delta t + \alpha(\Delta t) \Delta t}_h) \\ &= F(x) + dF(x)(\dot{x}(t) \Delta t + \alpha(\Delta t) \Delta t) + \\ &\quad \beta(\dot{x}(t) \Delta t + \alpha(\Delta t) \Delta t) \cdot |\dot{x}(t) \Delta t + \alpha(\Delta t) \Delta t| \\ &= F(x) + dF(x)(\dot{x}(t) \Delta t + \gamma(\Delta t) \Delta t) \end{aligned}$$

For some $\gamma(\Delta t) \rightarrow 0$ when $\Delta t \rightarrow 0$. This precisely means that $dF(x)\dot{x}(t)$ is the velocity vector of $F(x)$. As every vector attached to a point can be viewed as the velocity vector of some curve passing through this point, this theorem gives a clear geometric picture of dF as a linear map on vectors.

Theorem 1.10 Suppose we have two maps $F: U \rightarrow V$ and $G: V \rightarrow W$, where $U \subset \square^n, V \subset \square^m, W \subset \square^p$ (open domains). Let

$F: x \mapsto y = F(x)$. Then the differential of the composite map $GoF: U \rightarrow W$ is the composition of the differentials of F and G :

$$d(GoF)(x) = dG(y) \circ dF(x) \quad (4)$$

Proof. We can use the description of the differential. Consider a curve $x(t)$ in \square^n with the velocity vector \dot{x} . Basically, we need to know to which vector in \square^p it is taken by $d(GoF)$. the curve $(GoF)(x(t)) = G(F(x(t)))$. By the same theorem, it equals the image under dG of the Anycast Flow vector to the curve $F(x(t))$ in \square^m . Applying the theorem once again, we see that the velocity vector to the curve $F(x(t))$ is the image under dF of the vector $\dot{x}(t)$. Hence $d(GoF)(x) = dG(dF(x))$ for an arbitrary vector \dot{x} .

Corollary 1.0. If we denote coordinates in \square^n by (x^1, \dots, x^n) and in \square^m by (y^1, \dots, y^m) , and write

$$dF = \frac{\partial F}{\partial x^1} dx^1 + \dots + \frac{\partial F}{\partial x^n} dx^n \quad (1)$$

$$dG = \frac{\partial G}{\partial y^1} dy^1 + \dots + \frac{\partial G}{\partial y^m} dy^m, \quad (2)$$

Then the chain rule can be expressed as follows:

$$d(GoF) = \frac{\partial G}{\partial y^1} dF^1 + \dots + \frac{\partial G}{\partial y^m} dF^m, \quad (3)$$

Where dF^i are taken from (1). In other words, to get $d(GoF)$ we have to substitute into (2) the expression for $dy^i = dF^i$ from (3). This can also be expressed by the following matrix formula:

$$d(GoF) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial y^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial y^m} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \frac{\partial G^p}{\partial y^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial G^p}{\partial y^m} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial F^1}{\partial x^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial F^1}{\partial x^n} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \frac{\partial F^m}{\partial x^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial F^m}{\partial x^n} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} dx^1 \\ \dots \\ dx^n \end{pmatrix} \quad (4)$$

i.e., if dG and dF are expressed by matrices of partial derivatives, then $d(GoF)$ is expressed by the product of these matrices. This is often written as

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial z^1}{\partial x^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial z^1}{\partial x^n} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \frac{\partial z^p}{\partial x^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial z^p}{\partial x^n} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial z^1}{\partial y^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial z^1}{\partial y^m} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \frac{\partial z^p}{\partial y^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial z^p}{\partial y^m} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial y^1}{\partial x^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial y^1}{\partial x^n} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \frac{\partial y^m}{\partial x^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial y^m}{\partial x^n} \end{pmatrix}, \quad (5)$$

Or

$$\frac{\partial z^{\mu}}{\partial x^a} = \sum_{i=1}^m \frac{\partial z^{\mu}}{\partial y^i} \frac{\partial y^i}{\partial x^a}, \quad (6)$$

Where it is assumed that the dependence of $y \in \square^m$ on $x \in \square^n$ is given by the map F , the dependence of $z \in \square^p$ on $y \in \square^m$ is given by the map G , and the dependence of $z \in \square^p$ on $x \in \square^n$ is given by the composition GoF .

Definition 1.6. Consider an open domain $U \subset \square^n$. Consider also another copy of \square^n , denoted for distinction \square_y^n , with the standard coordinates $(y^1 \dots y^n)$. A system of coordinates in the open domain U is given by a map $F: V \rightarrow U$, where $V \subset \square_y^n$ is an open domain of \square_y^n , such that the following three conditions are satisfied:

- (1) F is smooth;
- (2) F is invertible;
- (3) $F^{-1}: U \rightarrow V$ is also smooth

The coordinates of a point $x \in U$ in this system are the standard coordinates of $F^{-1}(x) \in \square_y^n$

In other words,

$$F: (y^1 \dots, y^n) \mapsto x = x(y^1 \dots, y^n) \quad (1)$$

Here the variables $(y^1 \dots, y^n)$ are the “new” coordinates of the point x

Example 1.2. Consider a curve in \square^2 specified in polar coordinates as

$$x(t): r = r(t), \varphi = \varphi(t) \quad (1)$$

We can simply use the chain rule. The map $t \mapsto x(t)$ can be considered as the composition of

the maps $t \mapsto (r(t), \varphi(t)), (r, \varphi) \mapsto x(r, \varphi)$.

Then, by the chain rule, we have

$$\dot{x} = \frac{dx}{dt} = \frac{\partial x}{\partial r} \frac{dr}{dt} + \frac{\partial x}{\partial \varphi} \frac{d\varphi}{dt} = \frac{\partial x}{\partial r} \dot{r} + \frac{\partial x}{\partial \varphi} \dot{\varphi} \quad (2)$$

Here \dot{r} and $\dot{\varphi}$ are scalar coefficients depending on t , whence the partial derivatives $\frac{\partial x}{\partial r}, \frac{\partial x}{\partial \varphi}$ are

vectors depending on point in \square^2 . We can compare this with the formula in the “standard” coordinates:

$x = e_1 x + e_2 y$. Consider the vectors $\frac{\partial x}{\partial r}, \frac{\partial x}{\partial \varphi}$. Explicitly we have

$$\frac{\partial x}{\partial r} = (\cos \varphi, \sin \varphi) \quad (3)$$

$$\frac{\partial x}{\partial \varphi} = (-r \sin \varphi, r \cos \varphi) \quad (4)$$

From where it follows that these vectors make a basis at all points except for the origin (where $r=0$). It is instructive to sketch a picture, drawing vectors corresponding to a point as starting from that point. Notice that $\frac{\partial x}{\partial r}, \frac{\partial x}{\partial \varphi}$ are,

respectively, the velocity vectors for the curves $r \mapsto x(r, \varphi)$ ($\varphi = \varphi_0$ fixed) and

$\varphi \mapsto x(r, \varphi)$ ($r = r_0$ fixed). We can conclude that for an arbitrary curve given in polar coordinates

the velocity vector will have components $(\dot{r}, \dot{\varphi})$ if

as a basis we take $e_r := \frac{\partial x}{\partial r}, e_\varphi := \frac{\partial x}{\partial \varphi}$:

$$\dot{x} = e_r \dot{r} + e_\varphi \dot{\varphi} \quad (5)$$

A characteristic feature of the basis e_r, e_φ is that it is not “constant” but depends on point. Vectors “stuck to points” when we consider curvilinear coordinates.

Proposition 1.3. The velocity vector has the same appearance in all coordinate systems.

Proof. Follows directly from the chain rule and the transformation law for the basis e_i . In particular,

the elements of the basis $e_i = \frac{\partial x}{\partial x^i}$ (originally, a

formal notation) can be understood directly as the velocity vectors of the coordinate lines $x^i \mapsto x(x^1, \dots, x^n)$ (all coordinates but x^i are

fixed). Since we now know how to handle velocities in arbitrary coordinates, the best way to treat the

differential of a map $F: \square^n \rightarrow \square^m$ is by its action on the velocity vectors. By definition, we set

$$dF(x_0): \frac{dx(t)}{dt}(t_0) \mapsto \frac{dF(x(t))}{dt}(t_0) \quad (1)$$

Now $dF(x_0)$ is a linear map that takes vectors attached to a point $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}^n$ to vectors attached to the point $F(x) \in \mathbb{R}^m$

$$dF = \frac{\partial F}{\partial x^1} dx^1 + \dots + \frac{\partial F}{\partial x^n} dx^n$$

$$(e_1, \dots, e_m) \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial F^1}{\partial x^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial F^1}{\partial x^n} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \frac{\partial F^m}{\partial x^1} & \dots & \frac{\partial F^m}{\partial x^n} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} dx^1 \\ \dots \\ dx^n \end{pmatrix}, \quad (2)$$

In particular, for the differential of a function we always have

$$df = \frac{\partial f}{\partial x^1} dx^1 + \dots + \frac{\partial f}{\partial x^n} dx^n, \quad (3)$$

Where x^i are arbitrary coordinates. The form of the differential does not change when we perform a change of coordinates.

Example 1.3 Consider a 1-form in \mathbb{R}^2 given in the standard coordinates:

$A = -ydx + xdy$ In the polar coordinates we will have $x = r \cos \phi, y = r \sin \phi$, hence

$$dx = \cos \phi dr - r \sin \phi d\phi$$

$$dy = \sin \phi dr + r \cos \phi d\phi$$

Substituting into A , we get

$$A = -r \sin \phi (\cos \phi dr - r \sin \phi d\phi)$$

$$+ r \cos \phi (\sin \phi dr + r \cos \phi d\phi)$$

$$= r^2 (\sin^2 \phi + \cos^2 \phi) d\phi = r^2 d\phi$$

Hence $A = r^2 d\phi$ is the formula for A in the polar coordinates. In particular, we see that this is again a 1-form, a linear combination of the differentials of coordinates with functions as coefficients. Secondly, in a more conceptual way, we can define a 1-form in a domain U as a linear function on vectors at every point of U :

$$\omega(v) = \omega_1 v^1 + \dots + \omega_n v^n, \quad (1)$$

If $v = \sum e_i v^i$, where $e_i = \frac{\partial x}{\partial x^i}$. Recall that the differentials of functions were defined as linear functions on vectors (at every point), and

$$dx^i(e_j) = dx^i \left(\frac{\partial x}{\partial x^j} \right) = \delta_j^i \quad (2) \quad \text{at}$$

every point x .

Theorem 1.9. For arbitrary 1-form ω and path γ , the integral $\int_{\gamma} \omega$ does not change if we change parametrization of γ provide the orientation remains the same.

Proof: Consider $\left\langle \omega(x(t)), \frac{dx}{dt} \right\rangle$ and

$\left\langle \omega(x(t(t'))), \frac{dx}{dt} \right\rangle$ As

$$\left\langle \omega(x(t(t'))), \frac{dx}{dt} \right\rangle = \left\langle \omega(x(t(t'))), \frac{dx}{dt} \right\rangle \cdot \frac{dt}{dt},$$

Let p be a rational prime and let $K = \mathbb{R}(\zeta_p)$.

We write ζ for ζ_p or this section. Recall that K has degree $\phi(p) = p-1$ over \mathbb{R} . We wish to show that $O_K = \mathbb{R}[\zeta]$. Note that ζ is a root of $x^p - 1$, and thus is an algebraic integer; since O_K is a ring we have that $\mathbb{R}[\zeta] \subseteq O_K$. We give a proof without assuming unique factorization of ideals. We begin with some norm and trace computations. Let j be an integer. If j is not divisible by p , then ζ^j is a primitive p^{th} root of unity, and thus its conjugates are $\zeta, \zeta^2, \dots, \zeta^{p-1}$. Therefore

$$Tr_{K/\mathbb{R}}(\zeta^j) = \zeta + \zeta^2 + \dots + \zeta^{p-1} = \Phi_p(\zeta) - 1 = -1$$

If p does divide j , then $\zeta^j = 1$, so it has only the one conjugate 1, and $Tr_{K/\mathbb{R}}(\zeta^j) = p-1$ By linearity of the trace, we find that

$$Tr_{K/\mathbb{R}}(1 - \zeta) = Tr_{K/\mathbb{R}}(1 - \zeta^2) = \dots$$

$$= Tr_{K/\mathbb{R}}(1 - \zeta^{p-1}) = p$$

We also need to compute the norm of $1 - \zeta$. For this, we use the factorization

$$x^{p-1} + x^{p-2} + \dots + 1 = \Phi_p(x)$$

$$= (x - \zeta)(x - \zeta^2) \dots (x - \zeta^{p-1});$$

Plugging in $x = 1$ shows that

$$p = (1 - \zeta)(1 - \zeta^2) \dots (1 - \zeta^{p-1})$$

Since the $(1 - \zeta^j)$ are the conjugates of $(1 - \zeta)$, this shows that $N_{K/\mathbb{R}}(1 - \zeta) = p$ The key result for determining the ring of integers O_K is the following.

LEMMA 1.9

$$(1-\zeta)O_K \cap \mathbb{Z} = p\mathbb{Z}$$

Proof. We saw above that p is a multiple of $(1-\zeta)$ in O_K , so the inclusion $(1-\zeta)O_K \cap \mathbb{Z} \supseteq p\mathbb{Z}$ is immediate. Suppose now that the inclusion is strict. Since $(1-\zeta)O_K \cap \mathbb{Z}$ is an ideal of \mathbb{Z} containing $p\mathbb{Z}$ and $p\mathbb{Z}$ is a maximal ideal of \mathbb{Z} , we must have $(1-\zeta)O_K \cap \mathbb{Z} = p\mathbb{Z}$. Thus we can write

$$1 = \alpha(1-\zeta)$$

For some $\alpha \in O_K$. That is, $1-\zeta$ is a unit in O_K .

COROLLARY 1.1 For any $\alpha \in O_K$,

$$Tr_{K/\mathbb{Q}}((1-\zeta)\alpha) \in p\mathbb{Z}$$

PROOF. We have

$$\begin{aligned} Tr_{K/\mathbb{Q}}((1-\zeta)\alpha) &= \sigma_1((1-\zeta)\alpha) + \dots + \sigma_{p-1}((1-\zeta)\alpha) \\ &= \sigma_1(1-\zeta)\sigma_1(\alpha) + \dots + \sigma_{p-1}(1-\zeta)\sigma_{p-1}(\alpha) \\ &= (1-\zeta)\sigma_1(\alpha) + \dots + (1-\zeta^{p-1})\sigma_{p-1}(\alpha) \end{aligned}$$

Where the σ_i are the complex embeddings of K (which we are really viewing as automorphisms of K) with the usual ordering. Furthermore, $1-\zeta^j$ is a multiple of $1-\zeta$ in O_K for every $j \neq 0$. Thus

$Tr_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha(1-\zeta)) \in (1-\zeta)O_K$ Since the trace is also a rational integer.

PROPOSITION 1.4 Let p be a prime number and let $K = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_p)$ be the p^{th} cyclotomic field. Then

$$O_K = \mathbb{Z}[\zeta_p] \cong \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\Phi_p(x)); \quad \text{Thus}$$

$1, \zeta_p, \dots, \zeta_p^{p-2}$ is an integral basis for O_K .

PROOF. Let $\alpha \in O_K$ and write

$$\alpha = a_0 + a_1\zeta + \dots + a_{p-2}\zeta^{p-2} \quad \text{With } a_i \in \mathbb{Z}.$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha(1-\zeta) &= a_0(1-\zeta) + a_1(\zeta - \zeta^2) + \dots \\ &\quad + a_{p-2}(\zeta^{p-2} - \zeta^{p-1}) \end{aligned}$$

By the linearity of the trace and our above calculations we find that $Tr_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha(1-\zeta)) = pa_0$

We also have

$$Tr_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha(1-\zeta)) \in p\mathbb{Z}, \quad \text{so } a_0 \in \mathbb{Z} \quad \text{Next}$$

consider the algebraic integer

$(\alpha - a_0)\zeta^{-1} = a_1 + a_2\zeta + \dots + a_{p-2}\zeta^{p-3}$; This is an algebraic integer since $\zeta^{-1} = \zeta^{p-1}$ is. The same argument as above shows that $a_1 \in \mathbb{Z}$, and continuing in this way we find that all of the a_i are in \mathbb{Z} . This completes the proof.

Example 1.4 Let $K = \mathbb{Q}$, then the local ring $\mathbb{Z}_{(p)}$ is simply the subring of \mathbb{Q} of rational numbers with denominator relatively prime to p .

Note that this ring $\mathbb{Z}_{(p)}$ is not the ring \mathbb{Z}_p of p -adic integers; to get \mathbb{Z}_p one must complete $\mathbb{Z}_{(p)}$.

The usefulness of $O_{K,p}$ comes from the fact that it has a particularly simple ideal structure. Let a be any proper ideal of $O_{K,p}$ and consider the ideal

$a \cap O_K$ of O_K . We claim that $a = (a \cap O_K)O_{K,p}$; That is, that a is generated by the elements of a in $a \cap O_K$. It is clear from the definition of an ideal that $a \supseteq (a \cap O_K)O_{K,p}$.

To prove the other inclusion, let α be any element of a . Then we can write $\alpha = \beta/\gamma$ where $\beta \in O_K$ and $\gamma \notin p$. In particular, $\beta \in a$ (since $\beta/\gamma \in a$ and a is an ideal), so $\beta \in O_K$ and $\gamma \notin p$.

Since $1/\gamma \in O_{K,p}$, this implies that $\alpha = \beta/\gamma \in (a \cap O_K)O_{K,p}$, as claimed. We can use this fact to determine all of the ideals of $O_{K,p}$.

Let a be any ideal of $O_{K,p}$ and consider the ideal factorization of $a \cap O_K$ in O_K .

write it as $a \cap O_K = p^n b$ For some n and some ideal b , relatively prime to p . we claim first that $bO_{K,p} = O_{K,p}$. We now find that

$$a = (a \cap O_K)O_{K,p} = p^n bO_{K,p} = p^n O_{K,p}$$

Since $bO_{K,p} = O_{K,p}$. Thus every ideal of $O_{K,p}$ has the form $p^n O_{K,p}$ for some n ; it follows immediately that $O_{K,p}$ is noetherian. It is also now clear that

$p^n O_{K,p}$ is the unique non-zero prime ideal in $O_{K,p}$. Furthermore, the inclusion $O_K \hookrightarrow O_{K,p} / pO_{K,p}$

Since $pO_{K,p} \cap O_K = p$, this map is also surjection, since the residue class of $\alpha/\beta \in O_{K,p}$ (with $\alpha \in O_K$ and $\beta \notin p$) is the image of $\alpha\beta^{-1}$

in $O_{K/p}$, which makes sense since β is invertible in $O_{K/p}$. Thus the map is an isomorphism. In particular, it is now abundantly clear that every non-zero prime ideal of $O_{K,p}$ is maximal. To

show that $O_{K,p}$ is a Dedekind domain, it remains to show that it is integrally closed in K . So let $\gamma \in K$ be a root of a polynomial with coefficients in $O_{K,p}$; write this polynomial as $x^m + \frac{\alpha_{m-1}}{\beta_{m-1}}x^{m-1} + \dots + \frac{\alpha_0}{\beta_0}$ With $\alpha_i \in O_K$ and $\beta_i \in O_{K-p}$. Set $\beta = \beta_0\beta_1\dots\beta_{m-1}$. Multiplying by β^m we find that $\beta\gamma$ is the root of a monic polynomial with coefficients in O_K . Thus $\beta\gamma \in O_K$; since $\beta \notin p$, we have $\beta\gamma/\beta = \gamma \in O_{K,p}$. Thus $O_{K,p}$ is integrally closed in K .

COROLLARY 1.2. Let K be a number field of degree n and let α be in O_K then

$$N'_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha O_K) = |N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha)|$$

PROOF. We assume a bit more Galois theory than usual for this proof. Assume first that K/\mathbb{Q} is Galois. Let σ be an element of $Gal(K/\mathbb{Q})$. It is clear that $\sigma(O_K)/\sigma(\alpha) \cong O_{K/\alpha}$; since $\sigma(O_K) = O_K$, this shows that $N'_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\sigma(\alpha)O_K) = N'_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha O_K)$. Taking the product over all $\sigma \in Gal(K/\mathbb{Q})$, we have $N'_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha)O_K) = N'_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha O_K)^n$ Since $N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha)$ is a rational integer and O_K is a free \mathbb{Z} -module of rank n ,

$O_K/N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha)O_K$ Will have order $N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha)^n$; therefore

$$N'_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha)O_K) = N_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\alpha O_K)^n$$

This completes the proof. In the general case, let L be the Galois closure of K and set $[L:K] = m$.

F. Authors and Affiliations

Dr Akash Singh is working with IBM Corporation as an IT Architect and has been designing Mission Critical System and Service Solutions; He has published papers in IEEE and other International Conferences and Journals.

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